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ABSTRACT
Title of the dissertation: Greek-flagged fleet; A case study with special reference to
the importance, the cause and the remedy of its competitive edge.
This dissertation is a study of the loss of the competitiveness of the Greek-flagged fleet
and a proposal of how to remedy the situation.
To underline the importance of having the shipping industry run well, Greek shipping is
studied to signify the contribution of shipping to the national economy. In view of this,
the importance of having the industry competitively run in order to have the cutting edge
in global shipping is highlighted.
By presenting pertinent views from people who are directly involved in the business, the
problems that are affecting the industry and measures that have been effected lately to
improve the situation are shown.
In order to make a proposal for change, the cost of running a vessel over the last 10
years is investigated. The costs which have increased significantly within the period are
taken into account to see if there are changes that can be introduced in running the fleet.
The suggested proposals are derived from the above against recent developments in the
shipping industry. These include introduction of high level automation and a reduction
in level of manning.
A pre-study has been given using a reduced manning -simulated- project on a real vessel
and the advantages that would be reaped from such a commitment. This pre-study
includes the regulatory framework, an investment appraisal and proposed modifications
iv
to the present set up. The author suggests that running this project would be a suitable
pre-requisite for any company wishing to change the current status of the Greek flagged
fleet.
KEYWORDS: Greek flagged fleet, reduced manning, operating cost, automation,
competitiveness.
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1CHAPTER 1
Introduction
It is not anymore a phenomenon not even an issue the fact that the number of vessels
under OECD flags has been declined constantly the last 20 years. Although the majority
of the world tonnage is yet under the control of these countries, the shipowners/operators
have been forced to fly from the national registry in order to stay competitive in the
market. The major force of re-flagging has been the high operational cost under the
national flag and there are some exceptional cases where one may witness re-flagging
due to the shortage of national seafarers.
The Greek-controlled fleet is not an exception from this trend. Admittedly, the Greek
controlled fleet has exhibited a significant increase, in terms of number of vessels as
well as in terms of dead weight tonnage. However, following the trend of all the OECD
countries, the number of Greek-flagged vessels has shown a constant decrease since
1993. Additionally, fears for massive exodus have been expressed due to the constantly
increased operating cost under the national registry.
Lots of debate has taken place among the pertinent parties. In addition, measures have
been taken such as the option of low Greek compliment on board the Greek flagged
vessels in order to lower the daily operational cost. It is noteworthy that the problem has
been opposed only through conventional approaches, avoiding thus to introduce any
innovative scheme in the Greek shipping industry.
When the same problem arose earlier to other maritime nations, the companies/operators
addressed the problem with three options. The first, the easiest and fastest applicable
one, was to re-flag the vessels, lowering thus the daily operating cost and ultimately re-
gaining the lost competitiveness. The second solution came through the co-operation of
2their maritime administrations and was the introduction of international registries. Under
the regime of an international registry, a FOC manning is allowed and the flag state
control acts as the regulatory body. Nonetheless, the companies/operators with strong
belief in their national seafarers as part of their success story went a step further; they
introduced the concept of minimal crewing.
These shipowners/operators with the co-operation of the appropriate regulatory bodies
reduced manning compliments on board their vessels. The approach to achieve the
desirable reduction has varied, however not significantly. Additionally, most of these
countries, in order to be in line with the demanding expertise required to run these
vessels, introduced changes in the educational systems by upgrading their educational
programs to the current needs.
However, such projects have not been seen in the Greek shipping industry. The absence
of developing such projects and the fact that the loss of the competitiveness has been a
major issue in the literature related to Greek shipping were the triggers for the author to
make a research on minimal crewing. As a matter of fact, this dissertation aims:
• To identify the root of  the problem, which is the loss of the
competitiveness of the Greek flagged vessels,
• To economically appraise a possible solution of the problem.
Having had these objectives in mind, the following structure was adopted as appropriate
to address the issue of the loss of the competitiveness of the Greek flagged vessels:
Chapter I introduces to the reader the issue and how it will be evolved.
3Chapter II describes the problem nowadays the Greek shipping community is facing, the
loss of the competitiveness of the Greek-flagged vessels. Moreover, it analyses the
importance and the impact of shipping in the Greek economy.
Chapter III aims to detect the reason of the loss of the competitiveness of the Greek-
flagged fleet. Albeit the shipowners argue that it has been caused because of the highly
paid Greek officers and ratings, this chapter aims to verify this rationale. Therefore, in
an effort to detect the “liable” cost for the loss of the competitiveness the cost of
operating a vessel is analysed.
Chapter IV presents a selection of case studies. As it was mentioned earlier, similar
problems have been faced from other maritime nations, earlier than Greece, due to their
faster economic growth. Therefore, they have initialised various projects in order to
reduce the manning cost and recover their competitiveness. From all those projects,
three have been chosen as the most appropriate to be presented as case studies in this
chapter.
Chapter V aims to address the possible pros and cons of implementing a similar project
on a Greek-flagged vessel. The chapter serves as a pre-study before communicating the
project to the pertinent parties. Therefore, it will introduce to the reader the regulatory
framework of the project, the proposed modifications and it will be concluded with an
investment appraisal of the project.
Chapter VI concludes this work presenting the most important conclusions drawn out in
the previous chapters.
4Before closing this chapter and introducing the reader to the problem that the Greek
shipping community faces nowadays, it is very important for the author to tell the
difficulties had faced during the undertaking of this dissertation:
• Absence of data or research quantifying the impact of Greek shipping in the
national economy,
• Unwillingness of ship operators/owners to disclose financial information.
Ultimately, another and indirect method was selected to analyse the daily cost
of operating a vessel,
• Although the literature related to minimum manning level seems vast is finally
shallow, because no financial information is disclosed, resulting in the
difficulty to assess the actual outcome of these projects,
• The unwillingness of a few product suppliers to give data and prices about
their products.
5CHAPTER 2
Greek-flagged fleet; its competitiveness and significance for the national
economy
2.1 Shipping Cycles
2.1.1 The “poker” game
Cycles are not only the privilege of the shipping industry but also of many other
industries and the economy as a whole.  As a shipowner put it….“When I wake up in the
morning and the freight rates are high I feel good. When they are low I feel bad”.
Additionally, it is not just a problem encountered by the shipowners only. The buyers of
their services face the same risks, because the cost of transportation varies significantly
during the upturns and the slumps of the market. Therefore, shipping can be considered
as a “poker” game. The winner of the game, the shipowner or the shipper, depends
heavily on his strategy, philosophy, psychology and luck (Stopford, 1997).
2.1.2 The spot market
Admittedly, the shipping industry can be divided in two sectors; Industrial shipping and
freight market. In the first case, the shippers operate their own fleet or they use vessels
in time charter chartered from independent shipowners. Shippers either know the
quantities they need to transport or believe that transport is too important to be left to
chance. In the second case, shippers prefer to rely on independent shipowners for the
conveyance of their cargoes. Therefore, they hire vessels when needed.
 The latter market is the spot market. About 70% of the volume of goods transported at
sea is fixed in this way. The freight situation is mainly influenced by the following
factors, among others:
- The general state of the world economy,
- Sudden changes in the demand for specific commodities,
6- State of war,
- Crop failure,
- Closure of important routes,
- Oversupply of specific types of ships,
- Extreme congestion in important ports,
- An economic boom within special limited areas (Gorton et all, 1995).
2.1.3 Shipping cycles in short
People involved in shipping have accepted that cycles are part of their business. Lean
years will be followed by prosperous years. In short, shipping cycles can be described as
following:
A shortage of available capacity increases the freight rates. High level of freight rates
attracts new investments in business, which accordingly create an oversupply of
tonnage. The oversupply has as result the collapse of the market and the recession in the
shipping industry. Reconsidering the shipping cycles, one can conclude that they have a
purpose; to force out the weak shipping companies, leaving the strong to survive and
prosper (Stopford, 1997).
Interestingly, Clarkson’s Shipping Intelligence Weekly describes, in the first week of
March ’99, with chilling conciseness the operation of the entire industry as follows:
“You do not need to be rocket scientist to work it out, the formula is dead easy. Rates
rise; owners order; demand disappears; sentiment slumps; bankers go bonkers; amnesia
sets in and the whole process starts again. This simple sequence explains 98% of
shipping market activity over the last century”.
Nonetheless, economic historians have devoted much effort to analyse and classify
shipping cycles. They all agree that they are characterised by irregularities and they last
as long as it is necessary to bring the demand and supply sides back in black. As a rule
7of thumb, lean years lasts for 7-8 years while prosperous years last for 1-3 years
(Sandervarn, 1999).
2.2 Decision making tools
2.2.1 The subject in brief
It is hardly surprising that the shipping cycles are so prominent, considering the amount
of money involved. If we take the transport of grain from US Gulf to Rotterdam as an
example, a Panamax bulk carrier trading on the spot market could have earned, after the
operating expenses, about 1m$ in 1986, 3,5m$ in 1989, 1,5m$ in 1992 and 2,5m$ in
1995. On the other hand the ship itself, a five year old Panamax, would have cost 6m$ in
1986, 22m$ in 1989 and yet the same price in 1994 (Stopford, 1997).
In an industry where the name of the game is the cost, the people require analytical tools
to improve their decision making process. These analytical tools are the various
cost/benefit analysis patterns, which, however, have each one a different objective,
which is called “key word”. For instance, an approach described by the Norwegian
maritime economist Sverdsen has as an objective to reveal the minimum level of freight
rate, which should be accepted by the shipowner. Below that level, which is equal to the
variable costs, the shipowner should lay up the vessel in question. His breakdown
analysis is given as follows:
                                        Fixed costs                 Interests, depreciation, maintenance,
                                                                           Insurance, salary, overhead.
Operating cost
                                        Variable Costs            At sea - Bunkers
                                                                           At ports- port charges, cargo handling.
                                                    Source: Ma, 1998
82.2.2 The bottom line
The list of analytical tools is extensive. There are even different methods for the same
objective. However, the thesis’ objective is to present an alternative way to improve
vessel’s competitiveness, therefore the employment of a method revealing the cost
factors of international competition is the most appropriate. This can be succeeded by
singling out the cost elements, which differs from one country to another. The result of
the same is the subdivision of cost in national and international cost. Whereas national
costs are those varying from country to country, and while international costs are not
varying, irrespective of the nationality of the company (Ma, 1998).
 i. Crew
                                National Costs                         ii. Overhead and management
                                                                                iii. Taxes, iv. administrative cost
Total Cost
                                International Costs                  i.    Capital cost,
                                                           ii.   Bunker cost,
                    iii.  Port costs, iv. cargo handling,
        v.   Insurance, vi. M/R,
                    vii. International crew
                                    Source: Ma, 1998
Considering taxation and overhead expenses as optimised since the formation of the
company, the crew costs are revealed as a competitive edge for every shipping company.
2.3 Analysing vessel’s related costs
2.3.1 Currency markets
It was said before that shipowners employ their assets in a market being highly volatile.
Another aspect not considered during the presentation of the shipping cycles is the fact
9that shipowners are also exposed to the volatile currency markets. The local currency
can weaken and as a result it causes denomination of shipowners’ earnings.
2.3.2 Vessel’s costs analysis
Assuming that there is a cyclical slump of the market and inflationary cost pressures as
well, the immediate results from the market situation will be the erosion of shipowner
competitive position. The shipowner has at his disposal two alternatives; either to reduce
the costs or to enhance revenues. Of course, he can decide to employ both alternatives
simultaneously. However, his ability to boost revenue side is rather limited. Therefore,
he will ultimately concentrate his effort in the cost side.
The cost side is further subdivided in two related costs; the financial costs and the
operating costs. Getting started from the financial costs, the shipowner has the following
options to reduce the pressures of financial costs; the first option available at his disposal
is to refinance his debt and the second one is to reschedule his payments in the bank.
The concept of refinancing and rescheduling based on the postulate that the market will
create better employment opportunities and ultimately higher revenues. Another cost
included in the financial cost is the taxes. In the market’s slump the shipowner may also
look for more tax efficient structures.
Besides the financial costs, there are the vessel’s operating costs as well. It is worth
noting that the reduction of operating costs is dictated by a number of factors, among
them the standard of services which the shipowner must offer in a competitive
marketplace. The subdivision of the costs is best described in the diagram 1.
The percentages appeared in the diagram can vary according to the vessel’s type, size
and age. Especially the age of the vessel is a factor affecting heavily the various costs
such as the insurance premium. Nonetheless, the diagram clearly presents that the crew
10
cost is the single biggest cost, therefore it offers a wide scope for cost reduction
(Willingale, 1998).
Operating Costs
Manning     Insurance      Stores/Equipment      Lubes      Technical
                   33-50%       10-15%               7-12%                 4-8%         20-30%
                                                                                                            Administrative
                                                              Diagram 1                                   7-10%
Source: Willingale, 1998
2.3.3 The available options
The analysis of the operating costs boils down to a reasonable question; what are the
available options to reduce manning costs?  Potential savings can be realised either by
reducing the number of crew on board and/or by reducing their wages and the associated
benefits paid (Willingale, 1998). The investigation of the first option is the objective of
this thesis. The second option can be realised by substituting the current crew with a
cheaper alternative. A cheaper alternative is available through flagging out the vessel to
a flag State with more flexible manning rules. One may argue that shipowners flag out
their vessels for a number of reasons, however the principal reason is to reduce the
manning costs.
2.3.4 The shipping registries profile
A. Traditional registries
Examples of traditional registries: USA, UK, Greece and Norway. The operating cost is
higher under these registries as shipowners must ensure full compliance with all
maritime conventions. In addition, the vessels are crewed solely or largely by national
11
seafarers trained and certified by the flag State. The size of the traditional registries has
diminished over the past 20 years (Figure 1).
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Figure 1.
Source: Lloyds Register of Shipping, 1998
B. Open registries
Owners registering their vessels in one of the open registries are granted with:
- Freedom to select the nationality of their crews,
- Freedom to negotiate the terms and conditions of crew employment,
- Tax exemption,
- Elastic regulatory control,
- Company’s disclosure requirements.
The participation of open registries in the world fleet is presented in the figure 2.
Examples of open registries: Liberia, Panama, Cyprus, Bahamas.
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C. Second or parallel registries
These registries were set up to arrest the flight of the national flag shipowners to the
open registries or alternatively to attract the shipowners who had already made this
move to flag in. The incentive was the less stringent rules than those applied in the
national registry. Examples of second registries: Norwegian International Registry,
Danish International Registry, German International Registry (Willingale, 1998).
2.3.5 The history of manning
Considerable changes have occurred in international shipping during the last forty years.
The early fifties were characterised by stability and growth and the shipping industry
was dominated by large integrated companies. At that period greater priority was given
to costs such as maintenance, operation and time spent in the building process. The
manning costs were by no means the most influential factor.
Large companies under the pressure of the banks were closed during the shipping slump
of sixties and seventies. The result was thousands of unemployed seafarers, who
accordingly left the maritime industry, many of them through redundancy.
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The recession revealed streamlined companies, where the greatest attention was paid to
the vessel’s operating costs, especially in manning and associated areas. The most
significant change incurred on board during that period was the fact that the companies
moved from traditional western European crews to Far Eastern crews. The reason of the
movement can be seen as twofold; it was, initially, dictated by cost savings and the need
for survival, and recently by the shortage of European seafarers. However, it should be
mentioned that the shortage of European seafarers was a direct impact of the recession in
the early seventies and the policy followed on this matter at the latter stages (Drewry,
1990).
2.4 Greek manning rules; their impact on the national registry
2.4.1 The latest amendments on the Greek manning rules
Actually the manning rules were amended quite recently, in September 2nd 1997. The
amendments were introduced, under the pressure of the Union of Greek Shipowners, to
improve the competitiveness of the Greek flagged vessels and were focused on the
introduction of a manning scheme being able to reduce the manning cost. The
amendments were not focused on the reduction of the crew size.
On the contrary, the amendments were focused on the reduction of the required quota of
national seafarers. The previous manning rules required a solely Greek crew on Greek
registered vessels. Finally, the amendments were not those required by the Greek
shipowners. The following table presents the crew size required from the various sizes
of vessels flying the Greek flag.
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RANK 3,000-20,000gt 20,001-45,000gt 45,001gt and over
Master 1 1 1
Chief Officer 1 1 1
2nd Officer 1* 2 2
Deck Cadet 1
Bosun 1 1 1
AB 3 3 4
Chief Engineer 1 1 1
2nd Engineer 1 1 1
3rd Engineer 1 1 1
Engine Cadet or
Electrician
1
Electrician or 3rd
Engineer
1
Oiler or Engine Cadet 3 3 3
Chief Cook 1 1 1
Steward 1 1
Steward's Assistant 1
TOTAL 14 17 19
Table 1. Manning Requirements for Conventional Vessels
Source: Compiled by the Ministry of Mercantile Marine, 1997
 (*) For vessels sized from 10,000 to 20,000gt an additional 2nd Officer is required. For
tanker vessels, a Pump-man should be calculated as an additional. Furthermore, when
the vessel is adequately equipped and able to operate with unattended machinery space,
the following crew size is required.
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RANK 3000-20000gt 20001-45000gt 45001gt and over
Master 1 1 1
Chief Officer 1 1 1
2nd Officer 1* 2 2
Deck Apprentice 1
Bosun 1 1 1
AB 3 3 4
Chief Engineer 1 1 1
2nd Engineer 1 1 1
3rd Engineer 1 1
Engine Cadet or Electrician 1 1
Wiper 1
Chief Cook 1 1 1
Steward 1
Steward's Assistant 1 1
TOTAL 10 14 17
Table 2. Manning Requirements for “Totally Automated” Vessels
Source: Compiled by the Ministry of Mercantile Marine, 1997
(*) An additional 2nd Officer is required for vessel sized between 10,000 to 20,000gt. A
Pump-man should be also added for tanker vessels. However, if the vessel is equipped
with centralised Cargo Control Room (CCR) the employment of a Pump-Man is not
compulsory.
The Greek manning rules have been through constant changes, following the trends for
smaller crew compliments, however always taking into account the international safety
requirements. The innovation introduced in the latest amendments did not include any
further reduction of the crew size, but the reduction of the required quota of Greek
crewmembers that shall be on board. From the required number of crew described above
in both cases, conventional and totally automated vessels, the required number of Greek
crew is given in the following table. It is worth noting that the Master of the vessel shall
always have Greek nationality.
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3000-20000gt 20001-45000gt 45001-100000gt 100000gt and over
Officers 5 6 6 7
Ratings 3 3 4 4
Total 8 9 10 11
Table 3. Required number of Greeks
Source: Compiled by the Ministry of Mercantile Marine, 1997
2.4.2The abandonment of the Greek Flag
2.4.2.1 The counter proposal
The overhaul of the manning rules in 1997 was dismissed by the industry as ineffectual
and unsuccessful by their results. Although there has been a significant gain in the
amount of tonnage controlled by Greek shipowners over the last few years, the
continuous exodus from the Greek registered fleet has led shipping bodies tirelessly to
drum into the Greek Government the need to reduce costs incurred under the home flag.
Owners claim that Greek ship’s competitiveness has slumped due to having the lowest
foreign crewing allowance of any European Union registry and complained that
government’s efforts to safeguard the high quota of Greek jobs on board the fleet are
misguided.
The Hellenic Chamber of Shipping as well as the Union of Greek Shipowners, during
the drafting of the amendments, proposed that the number of Greek officers should be
reduced to 4-6 persons, according to the size of the vessel. The junior officers as well as
the ratings should be from the international labour market. In the argument that by
implementing the proposal the number of jobs that have to be cut will be high, owners
replied that since the proposed amendments can not improve the competitiveness they
would re-flag their vessel and the result would be a even higher number of lost jobs.
Their proposal was based on the concept to maintain a significant number of Greek
officers on board, who accordingly will transfer the know-how to the next generations.
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Simultaneously, the free selection of junior officers and ratings would give them the
opportunity to stay competitive in the market. Additionally, another competitive edge of
the Greek shipping industry is the employment of people with sea going background at
shore positions. Their input in the success story of Greek shipping is considerable.
Therefore, by flagging out vessels the number of experienced Greek officers to be
occupied for these positions is decreasing and the Greek shipping industry is loosing yet
another competitive edge (Hellenic Chamber of Shipping, 1998).
2.4.2.2 The impact on the Greek registry
Figure 3. Greek owned vessels/Greek registered vessels 1988-98
Source:  Compiled by Hellenic Chamber of Shipping, 1999 and Union of Greek
Shipowners, 1999
By analysing the statistics of Greek shipping in the last 10 years, it is revealed that the
number of vessels operated under Greek interests has increased by 35%, while at the
same time the number of vessels registered under the Greek flag has declined by 6,6%. It
is worth noting that the decrease has been accelerated in the last five years, where the
percentage of vessels which left the registry was 13,1% (Hellenic Chamber of Shipping,
1999 and Union of Greek Shipowners, 1999).
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However, while the number of vessels under the Greek flag decreased through the years,
the gross tonnage has steadily increased year by year. In 1988 the gross registered
tonnage accounted for 21,3 millions and in 1998 the number has increased to almost 26
millions. According to John Hazipateras, chairman of the Greek Shipowners Co-
operation Committee (GSCC), there is a simple explanation for this phenomenon of
increasing gross tonnage: “ It is true that we have been screaming that a lot of tonnage
would leave the flag. What has happened in recent years is that a number of large ships,
particularly newbuildings, have come in and made things look considerably better”.
The majority of shipowners have no doubt about where to point the figure of blame for
this alarming decline of the flag. Nonetheless, the Minister replies… “We will not allow
the Greek flag to become a flag of convenience at an expense to make the social problem
even worse”. And he continues saying… “Ships will carry on leaving the registry not
because of the seafarers, but because of the international market reasons”. On the other
side the chairman of the GSCC replies as follows… “The government has done very
little to put a stop to ships leaving for other registries, where the owner has the
opportunity to operate his vessels with the same responsibility and protection, but viable
cheaper”. “They feel that it is a luxury they simply can not afford, if they are to survive”
he concludes (Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 1999 and Lloyd’s Shipping Management,
1999 and Hellenic Chamber of Shipping, 1998).
The government will not be forced to take actions until the time where the decline of the
national registry will reach a panic point. This is the general consensus of opinion
among the owners (Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 1999).
Interestingly, there are Greek shipowners/companies, for instance Ceres Hellenique,
who have committed themselves to the Greek flag. They know that they sound idealistic,
however they strongly believe that their successful story has its root in the use of the
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Greek flag as well as in the sweat and the blood of the Greek seafarers (Lloyd’s
Shipping Economist, 1999). Furthermore, there are companies, like Costamare, who
have made their calculations of the minimum acceptable freight rate and the period till
when they can afford it. If in the pre-calculated period the market situation does not
improve, they prefer to send the vessel for scrap than to change the home flag and the
nationality of the crew!(Constantakopoulos, 1999)
2.4.3 The importance of shipping in the Greek economy
2.4.3.1 Balance of  trade
By citing the world trade evolution, the fluctuations of the world economies, the Greek
efforts for being converged with the other EU economies and the contribution of
shipping in these efforts during the decade, one can realise the importance of a strong
home registry in the Greek national economy.
1990
World trade: In spite of the deceleration in the respective rates of annual increase
compared to 1989, the international sea borne trade in 1990 appears to have reached a
new record high both in terms of volume and tonne miles. According to Fearnleys, the
total tonnage shipments increased in 1990 by 3% and tonne miles by 4%, where the
corresponding percentage increases in 1989 were respectively 5% and 7%.
World economy: Undoubtedly the slow down in the world growth and especially in the
in the OECD countries had as a result the deceleration of the world sea borne trade
growth. The increase of the GNP for the whole of OECD countries was 2,6%, which is
lower not only to the 3,3% during the 1989 but also to the 3,1% annual average increase
during the period of 1982-1989.
Greek performance: The performance of the Greek economy for 1990 can only be
characterised as weak. While the GDP increased by 2,8% during 1989 and the average
annual increase of GDP during the period of 1982-1989 was 1,8%, during 1990 the
increase of GDP declined in the weak 1,2%. The reflection of the weak performance is
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the deficit of 12,292m$ in the balance of trade and 3,598m$ in the balance of payments.
The deficits during 1989 were 9,120m$ and 2,573m$ respectively.
Greek shipping support: Although the weak performance of the Hellenic economy, the
Greek shipping increased its contribution, through direct generation of foreign exchange,
to the balance of trade deficit from 1,375m$ during the 1989 to 1,778m$ during this year
(Union of Greek Shipowners, 1991).
1991
World Trade: The weak world economy was reflected in the deceleration of the
increase of international sea borne trade. According to Fearnlays review, the total
tonnage of shipments increased by 1,2% and in terms of tonne-miles the increase was
1,6%.
World economy: The real GDP growth for the whole of the OECD countries in that
year was estimated to have been no more than 1%, which implies that the world
economy could not manage to be pulled out of recession.
Greek performance: Despite the significant improvement in the balance of payments,
the deficit was reduced to 1,459m$, and the small decline in the balance of trade, the
recorded deficit was 12,311m$, the whole year could only characterised by the recession
which was reflected in the 0,4% increase in the GDP.
Greek shipping support: In spite of the global recession, the Greek shipping continued
to play a key role of the country’s invisible earnings and in bridging the country’s deficit
in the balance of trade. The foreign exchange earnings generated during that year were
1,773m$ (Union of Greek Shipowners, 1992).
1992
World trade: During 1992 both the volume of sea borne trade and the tonne-mile
indicators were increased by 2,3%. In terms of numbers, the total volume of cargoes
transported by the sea reached the 4,110 million tonnes while the tonne-mile demand
raised to 18,280 billion. Nonetheless, the percentage of increase in terms of volume and
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tonne-miles was not reflected in the freight rates. The freight rates were slightly weaker
than 1991, because of the increase of the available tonnage, especially in the tanker
market.
World economy: A slight economic growth was reflected by an increase of the GDP.
The real GDP for the whole of the OECD countries was 1,4%, slightly higher than the
1% of the previous year.    
Greek performance: The tight economic policy implemented since 1992 with the
objectives of reducing inflation, reducing the public sector borrowing requirements as a
percentage of GDP and improving efficiency through privatisation of the state controlled
enterprises had as a result the continuation of the recession for the Greek economy.
During that year the increase of the GDP was estimated to 1%. Balance of trade and
balance of payments were increased by 12,5% and 33,4% respectively and they were
accounted for 13,840m$ USD and 2,02m$ respectively.
Greek shipping support: Although the slightly weaker freight rates compared with
those of 1991, the foreign exchange earnings generated by shipping reached the
1,994m$ and helped in bridging, once more, the widening deficit in the balance of trade
(Union of Greek shipowners, 1993).
1993-1994
World economy: The average combined GDP of the OECD economies was climbed to
2,9%, presenting a big improvement. However, it should be noted that the growth in the
key industrialised areas was not synchronised. The USA had been on a growth path
since 1992 and reached its peak during 1994, where the GDP increased by 4%. In
contrast, the Japanese economy after a long recession enjoyed its first year of recovery
during 1994. Additionally, the dynamic Asian economies reached a GDP increase of
7,3%. The growth of the world economy was characterised booming, because of the
unsynchronised growth.
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World trade: The world growth had a direct impact in the demand for maritime
transport and it was directly expressed trough an increase of the freight rates, especially
during the second half of 1994.
Greek performance: The restructuring policies introduced during 1993 and the strict
stabilisation program resulted in the negative growth of GDP (-0,5%) during 1993 and
an increase of 1% during 1994. The balance of trade deficit reached 11,6b$ during 1993
and reduced slightly down to 11b$ during 1994.
Greek shipping support: The foreign exchange earnings from shipping during 1993-
1994 were almost reached each year the 2b$, covering the endemic Greek trade deficit.
It is noteworthy that this number does not include capital investments of Greek
shipowners in other sectors nor the income generated abroad by Greek seafarers (Union
of Greek Shipowners, 1995).
1995
World trade: The UN figures showed an increase of 11% in the world trade. That is to
say, the deceleration of the world economy had not been yet reflected to the economic
activity.
World economy: On one hand, the economies of Asia, excluding Japan, showed a
growth of their GDP of 8%. On the other hand, the economies of the developed world,
G7 countries, showed a sharp deceleration and their GDP increased on average by 2%.
In details, the economy of the USA was kept in a sustainable pace of growth of 2%,
while the Japanese GDP increased merely by 0,5% and the German by 1,9%.
Greek performance: The main characteristic of the Greek economy during 1995 was
the single digit inflation rate for the first time in the last two decades. The inflation rate,
which was 15,8% during 1992, was running less than 9% at the end of 1995. The
nominal interest rates in the Greek capital market were followed by the strong decline of
the inflation rate and as a result the investments in the private sector were boost by 5%.
Nonetheless, the GDP increased only by 1,8% because of the restrictive economic
policy.  Additionally, the government’s anti-inflation policy included a hard drachma
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policy. The hard drachma policy not only affected the competitiveness of the national
economy but also the competitiveness of the shipping sector. The loss of the
competitiveness of the national economy partially explain the widening of the balance of
trade deficit to 3,5b$ as well as the widening of the balance of payments deficit to 3,3
billion drachmas. Notably, the balance of payments during 1994 was positive with a
surplus of 80m$.
Greek shipping support: The foreign exchange earnings from shipping, which are
contribute to the bridging of the balance of trade deficit, broke the barrier of 2b$ and
actually accounted for 2,2b$, an increase of 14% since 1994. This development was
succeeded despite the sharp decline of the world growth and the partially loss of the
competitiveness of the Greek shipping due to the hard drachma policy (Union of Greek
Shipowners, 1996).
1996
World trade: From 1994 to 1996 the total sea borne trade was increasing steadily. The
4,506 million tonnes of cargo transported by sea during 1994 increased to 4,687 million
tonnes during 1995 and it reached the 4,790 million tonnes during 1996. The increasing
trend of sea borne was reflecting the prosperity and the trends of growth of the world
economy.
World economy: Low inflation rates and steady growth are the two main features of
that year for the world economy. The real GDP increased by 3,6% and the inflation rates
were 2,4% for the EU countries, 2,9% for USA and 7,5% for Asia. The corresponding
inflation rates for the 1995 were 3%, 2,8% and 11,3%.
Greek performance: Although the national economic indices, inflation rate 7,5% and
GDP growth 2,6%, were showing a big improvement towards the convergence with the
other EU economies, the balance of trade deficit further had widened and reached the
18,4b$. It was the proof that the economy had lost its international competitiveness,
underlying the importance of the shipping in the sustainable growth of the national
economy. The widening gap in the deficit of balance of trade had resulted in further
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deterioration of the balance of payments deficit which reached the 4,5b$ (3,3b$ in
1995).
The Greek shipping support: The loss of the competitiveness of the Greek registered
vessels and the flagging out resulted in the deceleration of the foreign exchange earnings
from shipping. The earnings accounted for 2,3b$ while last year’s earnings were 2,2b$,
representing an increase of 5% while last year’s increase of earnings reached the 14%
(Union of Greek Shipowners, 1997).
1997
World trade: The acceleration of the world sea borne trade in 1996 in terms of volume
and tonne-miles, 3,7% and 2,4% respectively, continued during 1997 and reached a
4,4% increase in terms of volume carried and a 3,6% increase in terms of tonne-miles.
World economy: Despite the disturbances in the capital markets, the resilient moods of
the economic activities around the world had resulted in an increase of 3,8% in the
world GDP during the year. The increase was higher than the increase of world GDP
during the 1992-1996 period, where the average increase was 3,4%.
Greek performance: The government’s efforts to converge the economy with the other
EU members economies and to meet the criteria for membership to EMU had resulted
an acceleration of the GDP from 2,4% during 1996 to 3,3% in 1997 and simultaneously
a deceleration of the inflation to 5,5 %. On the negative side, the balance of payments
further deteriorated to 4,8b$, mostly because of reduced international competitiveness of
the national economy and partially because of the loss making public sector and the lack
of flexibility in the labour markets.
The Greek shipping support: The depressed freight rates and the de-flagging from the
home flag resulted in the decrease of contribution of shipping in the balance of trade
deficit. The direct foreign exchange earnings from shipping in 1997 accounted for 2,1b$,
an 8% decrease compared to 2,26b$ contribution during 1996 (Union of Greek
Shipowners, 1998).
25
2.4.3.2 Employment places
The contribution of Greek shipping to the national economy is not restricted to the
bridging of the balance of trade deficit by importing in the country the foreign exchange
earnings. Another important sector of the national economy is tourism. However, in
order to contribute with the same amount of foreign exchange, like the shipping
companies do, another 5 to 6 million tourists have to visit the country each year.
Shipping creates, additionally, a significant number of jobs ashore, for instance among
others the working staff in shipping companies, in the brokerage companies, in the
shipping banks and in the shipping law firms. There are also businesses offering services
to shipping not directly related to shipping as such, among others, travel agents and
doctors. That is to say, the more vessels are under the Greek flag, the more jobs are
created ashore.
One may argue that it is not a matter of the number of vessels under the Greek flag, but
it is a matter of how many vessels are under the Greek control. The answer is
straightforward that the most important is that the vessel should be under the home flag.
It has already been proved that when a vessel is registered under another registry, the
crew department will be moved to the country of the crew. Later on the technical
department will also be moved to the same country, because the superintendents will be
chosen to have the same nationality as the crew.
The impact of foreign exchange earnings form shipping, in the balance of trade, was
described above. People involved in Greek shipping know this quite well. However, the
impact in the national economy of the earnings generated by the people serving directly
or indirectly in shipping has never been studied. It is noteworthy because shipping is the
most sizeable and the most successful industry of Greece. In the various major events of
Greek shipping they present the researches made by other countries interested in
quantifying the question of impact in their national economy.
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One of the researches used to present the impact of shipping in the national economy is
the one contacted for the American Congress and its results were as follows:
- Each position on board creates additional four positions for the national
economy,
- Each dollar generated by shipping generates another one and a half dollar of
general income for the national economy.
The other one is a Dutch research, where it is stated that from the total amount of added
value generated by shipping, 30% is generated by the vessel, while the remaining 70% is
generated by the activities of the offices supporting the vessels and are located in
Holland.
The only parameter that has been quantified is the number of people involved, directly
and indirectly, in shipping. The following figures are relevant for Greek shipping:
- 30,000 seafarers where half of them sailing in the ocean going vessels,
- 15,000 shore staff,
- 11,000 people are working in indirect shipping activities,
- Several thousands of people in the wider area of shipping (Hellenic Chamber
of Shipping, 1999).
In an effort to verify the number of active Greek seafarers raw data was collected from
the Ministry of Mercantile Marine, department of statistics, and the author’s results are
as follows:
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 Year A B C Total
1986 4,537 3,136 29,404 37,077
1988 3,146 2,632 26,103 31,881
1990 1,131 2,212 24,554 27,897
1992 314 1,762 23,516 25,592
1994 519 1,652 24,190 26,361
1996 467 1,436 22,556 24,459
Average 28,877.83
Table 4. Number of Greek seafarers 1986-1996.
Source: Compiled by Department of recruitment 1989-99 and Department of Shipping
statistics 1987-89.
Where,
A: The number of registered unemployed Greek Seafarers
B: The number of Greek seafarers employed in Greek owned vessels, which are
not flying the home flag, however are contracted with the Greek Seafarers
Pension Fund (NAT).
C: Number of Greek seafarers employed in Greek registered vessels.
From the table above, it can be seen that the average number of Greek seafarers during
the last decade is 28,878, an estimation quite close to the estimation given by the
Hellenic Chamber of Shipping. It should be noted that in the above calculation the
number of Greek Seafarers employed in Greek owned vessels under foreign flags and
not contracted with NAT has not been taken into account. Their sign on and off in these
vessels are not registered by the Ministry and/or the Coast Guard, therefore there is no
data available. Nevertheless, the number is not considered significant for the calculation.
The most important observation in the table is the acceleration of the decline in the
number of Greek seafarers. The percentage of the decline, in only one-decade, accounted
for 34%. Another noteworthy fact is that towards 1998 unemployment had increased. It
is also remarkable that as the number of seafarers declines, year by year, the number of
unemployed seafarers decreases. That is to say, the seafarers left through redundancy or
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retired, as the number of vessels flown from the registry during 1988-1995 can not be
considered as the cause for the reduction of 12,618 seafarers.
In the following table is presented the point where the number of vessels and the number
of unemployment seafarers had been found in a balance. The parameter of the
conclusion is the point where the number of unemployment decreased to the minimum
for the whole decade. During 1995 the number of unemployed reduced to 227, the
number of vessels under the Greek flag were 2,051 and the total number of seafarers
accounted for about 25,500. The number of seafarers was calculated by interpolation
between 1994 and 1996. The Greek statistic department measures the number of active
Greek seafarers once every two years.
Year
Number of Greek
Owned Vessels
Number of
Greek Flagged
Vessels
Number of Greek
Seafarers
Number of
Unemployed
Seafarers
Number of foreign
seafarers employed on
Greek Flagged vessels
1988 2487 2015 31881 3146 5373
1989 2428 2004 1877
1990 2426 2031 27897 1131 6150
1991 2454 2062 660
1992 2688 2095 25592 314 8390
1993 2749 2166 360
1994 3019 2149 26361 519 9183
1995 3142 2051 227
1996 3246 2013 24459 467 8193
1997 3201 1927 870
1998 3358 1882 895
Table 5. Source: Compiled by Department of Shipping Statistics, years 87-97 and
Department of Recruitment, years 89-99 and Hellenic Chamber of Shipping, 1999
Additionally, since 1995 where the exodus has commenced, one can clearly identify an
acceleration in the level of unemployment. Quantifying the acceleration, the result is an
increase of 75% in the level of unemployment for the last three years, while the exodus
is only at the beginning with the loss of 169 vessels. Furthermore, in 1990 the
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percentage of Greek crew on board Greek flagged vessels was 80% and later reduced in
73%. The new amendments allow the Greek compliment to be reduced to 60%.
Taking into account that since 1995 the manning rules have been through changes, the
allowable number of foreign crew has been increased and the fact that the number of
vessels under the home flag declined, one can draw the conclusion that the number of
seafarers will be further reduced. If manning follows the cyclical moods of  shipping as
well, then one should wait the point where the flight of the vessel from the home flag
will be stopped and the new equilibrium between the number of seafarers and the
number of vessels will be established.
The problem is that under these circumstances the industry will suffer in the near future
for two main reasons. First, the exodus of the seafarers will be continued and probably
will be accelerated for the reasons described. Second, the sector will not be attractive for
recruitment of new seafarers, therefore in the long term or even in the short term, if the
exodus under the prevailing circumstances is massive, the sector will be faced with
shortage of seafarers, considering the fact that the government will take measures to
attract the vessels back to the home flag when the number of vessels in the registry will
reach the bottom. Another fact presented in the above table is the increase of foreign
crew on board the Greek flagged vessels, which probably will be accelerated after the
1997 amendments of the manning rules.
2.5 Concluding the chapter
This chapter touched upon a serious problem which today the Greek shipping
community is facing, the loss of competitiveness. The importance and the impact of
shipping in the national economy has also been analysed. The following chapter will
analyse the ship’s related costs in an effort to find out the reason of the loss of
competitiveness of Greek flagged vessels.
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CHAPTER 3
Analysing the ship’s relating costs
Having discussed the problem which the Greek flag is facing nowadays and having
analysed the importance of the problem for the national economy, the subsequent step is
the detection of the reason which had resulted in the loss of the competitiveness.
Although the shipowners argue that it has been caused because of the highly paid Greek
crews, this chapter aims to verify this rationale. Therefore, in an effort to detect the
“liable” cost for the loss of the competitiveness the cost of operating a vessel will be
analysed.
The cost of operating a vessel will be analysed by using the cost division described in
Ch.2. In short, the vessel’s total cost is subdivided in national and international. The
national costs are the vessel’s associated costs which their level is depended by the rules
of the flying flag, while international costs are those costs which are similar for all the
shipowners/operators irrelevant to their nationality.
Therefore, the measurement of tendencies for the international costs will be done
according to the provisions of the international statistics and averages of the industry.
The costs affected by the rules and requirements of the Greek registry will be measured
according to what is valid in the country. Finally, the analysis is focused on tankers and
bulkers, which are the two main sectors of interest for the Greek shipowners.
3.1 International costs
3.1.1 Insurance
Hull and Machinery (H&M) and Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance markets
have different drivers as well as evolution in their own market cycles. Therefore, the
analysis of the insurance will be further subdivided in H&M insurance and P&I cover.
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Moreover, it should be cited the fact that from all the operating costs of a vessel,
insurance is the least amenable cost for generalisation due to the fact that the insurers are
looking first at the owner of the vessel and then at the vessel.
3.1.1.1 The H&M insurance
45,000dwt 95,000dwt 150,000dwt 280,000dwt
Cost
pd A B
Cost
pd A B
Cost
pd A B
Cost
pd A B
1991 670 12% 810 12% 1,040 14% 1,715 18%
1992 930 15% 39% 1,125 16% 39% 1,450 18% 39% 2,400 22% 40%
1993 795 13% -15% 960 14% -15% 1,235 16% -15% 2,040 19% -15%
1994 605 11% -24% 725 11% -24% 905 13% -27% 1,630 17% -20%
1995 465 9% -23% 575 9% -21% 725 11% -20% 1,300 14% -20%
1996 450 8% -3% 560 9% -3% 715 10% -1% 1,285 13% -1%
1997 465 8% 3% 575 9% 3% 725 10% 1% 1,300 13% 1%
1998 480 8% 3% 590 9% 3% 755 10% 4% 1,345 13% 3%
-19% -18% -18% -12%
A: the percentage of cost in the total operating
cost,
B: the annual fluctuation of the cost,
The cost per day (pd)  is
in USD.
TABLE 6: Daily H&M insurance cost for different tanker sizes, 1991-1998
Source: Compiled by Drewry, 1998b.
 By analysing the data cited in the tables 6 and 7, it can be seen that in both tankers and
bulkers the daily cost of H&M insurance has declined and averages 17% for the tankers
and 35% for bulkers. As a result, while for tankers the H&M insurance accounted for
15% of the daily operating cost of the vessel, it has shrunk down to 10%. In the bulkers
the shrinkage is much more impressive because it accounted for 20% of the daily
operating cost and during the last years it only accounts for 10%.
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The sharp decline in the premiums is the result of the swings in the capacity of the
insurance market. More detailed, during 1991-92 the underwriters experienced severe
losses, because of the “Piper Alpha” casualty in 1988. The severe losses had resulted in
sharp increase in premiums and shrinkage of the market. Nonetheless, as ever with
dynamic markets, the shrinkage in the underwriting market was followed by an over
capacity, resulting in the sharp decline of the premiums in the late 90s. The only
difference is that nowadays the underwriters are entering into a contract more
selectively, after the severe losses incurred in the beginning of the 90s (Drewry, 1998a).
25/50,000dwt 50/80,000dwt 80/150,000dwt 150,000dwt+
Cost pd A B Cost
pd
A B Cost pd A B Cost pd A B
1991 189 17% 248 18% 324 20% 340 22%
1992 261 21% 38% 347 23% 40% 471 25% 45% 475 26% 40%
1993 217 17% -17% 295 19% -15% 425 22% -10% 415 23% -13%
1994 148 12% -32% 186 13% -37% 301 16% -29% 286 16% -31%
1995 127 10% -14% 148 10% -20% 242 13% -20% 230 13% -20%
1996 110 9% -13% 125 8% -16% 236 13% -2% 212 12% -8%
1997 101 8% -8% 113 7% -10% 201 11% -15% 181 10% -15%
1998 109 8% 8% 130 8% 15% 208 11% 3% 208 11% 15%
-38% -43% -27% -31%
A: the percentage of cost in the total operating cost,
B: the annual fluctuation of the cost expressed in percentage,
Cost per day in USD.
TABLE 7. Daily H&M insurance cost for different bulker sizes, 1991-1998
Source: Compiled by Ocean Shipping Consultants, 1998
3.1.1.2 Protection and Indemnity cover
In converse with the H&M premiums, P&I cover has constantly increased in the last 8
years. A lot of observers say that the increase in premiums can be characterised as
permanent, because the world nowadays is more litigious than before. The two main
factors which have affected this tendency are the acceleration of the environmental
awareness and the ever most costly injury awards (Drewry, 1998a).
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45,000dwt 95,000dwt 150,000dwt 280,000dwt
Cost pd A B Cost
pd
A B Cost pd A B Cost pd A B
1991 165 3% 235 4% 285 4 505 5%
1992 235 4% 42% 330 5% 40% 425 5 49% 740 7% 47%
1993 275 5% 17% 400 6% 21% 505 6 19% 890 8% 20%
1994 300 5% 9% 440 7% 10% 535 8 6% 975 10% 10%
1995 315 6% 5% 450 7% 2% 550 8 3% 1000 11% 3%
1996 330 6% 5% 480 8% 7% 575 8 5% 1055 11% 6%
1997 345 6% 5% 505 8% 5% 600 8 4% 1110 11% 5%
1998 355 6% 3% 520 8% 3% 615 8 3% 1135 11% 2%
86% 89% 88% 92%
A: the percentage of cost in the total operating cost,
B: the annual fluctuation of the cost,
Cost per day in USD
TABLE 8. Daily P&I insurance cost for different tanker sizes, 1991-1998
Source: Compiled by Drewry, 1998 (b)
The data of P&I cost for the last 8 years for tankers and bulkers has been visualised in
the tables 8 and 9. By examining and analysing the given data one can see that in the
non-environmental friendly tankers the premium has increased on average of 89%. The
average includes all the sizes of tankers. The increase in the cost had as a result the
increase of P&I expense in the contribution of the daily operating cost from 6% to 8%.
In bulkers, the increase was not so sharp as in the case of tankers. However, it averages
an increase of 26%. It is noteworthy that the value range of increase is broad in bulkers.
In the 150,000dwt+ size of bulkers the total increase, through the last 8 years, accounted
for only 12%. On the contrary for the panamax size bulkers, the total increase was
accounted for 43%. Therefore, in the bulkers the contribution of P&I premiums in the
daily operating costs has slightly declined from 7% to 6%.
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25/50,000dwt 50/80,000dwt 80/150,000dwt 150,000dwt+
Cost pd A B Cost pd A B Cost pd A B Cost pd A B
1991 54 5% 66 5% 100 6% 105 7%
1992 76 6% 41% 95 6% 44% 145 8% 45% 145 8% 38%
1993 81 6% 7% 110 7% 16% 168 9% 16% 165 9% 14%
1994 63 5% -22% 89 6% -19% 145 8% -14% 136 9% -18%
1995 58 5% -8% 78 5% -12% 122 7% -16% 110 8% -19%
1996 57 5% -2% 79 5% 1% 120 6% -2% 106 6% -4%
1997 58 4% 2% 82 5% 4% 112 6% -7% 102 6% -4%
1998 60 4% 3% 90 6% 10% 115 6% 3% 106 6% 4%
21% 43% 26% 12%
A: the percentage of cost in the total operating cost,
B: the annual fluctuation of the cost,
Cost per day in USD.
TABLE 9. Daily P&I insurance cost for different bulker sizes, 1991-1998.
Source: Compiled by Ocean Shipping Consultants, 1998
3.1.2 Repairs and maintenance
The repairs and maintenance cost is composed of the running repairs and maintenance as
well as of the docking repairs and maintenance. In the bulk carrier sector, in the
beginning of 90s the yearly increase was around 5%. However, the rise of the cost has
been decelerated since 1995, and as a result the annual increase has been declined to 2%
on average. Nonetheless, the total increase in the repairs and maintenance cost since
1991 accounts for 25% (table 10).
Another point is that in total, the repairs and maintenance are representing 27% of the
daily operating cost, on average among all sizes of bulkers. Additionally, there is a
tendency of a 3% increase in the contribution of repairs and maintenance in the total
operating cost in all the sizes of bulkers. Notably, the costs involved in the repairs and
maintenance of this type of ships is lower than those of the tankers.
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Tankers
45,000dwt 95,000dwt 150,000dwt 280,000dwt
A1 B C A2 B C A2 B C A2 B C
1991 1,300 23% 1,780 27% 2,150 29% 2,600 27%
1992 1,315 22% 1% 1,810 26% 2% 2,180 28% 1% 2,685 25% 3%
1993 1,330 22% 1% 1,820 26% 1% 2,190 28% 0% 2,740 26% 2%
1994 1,110 20% -17% 1,440 23% -21% 1,820 26% -17% 2,330 24% -15%
1995 1,110 21% 0% 1,440 23% 0% 1,835 27% 1% 2,355 25% 1%
1996 1,135 21% 2% 1,480 24% 3% 1,865 27% 2% 2,395 25% 2%
1997 1,165 21% 3% 1,505 24% 2% 1,905 27% 2% 2,450 25% 2%
1998 1,190 21% 2% 1,550 24% 3% 1,975 27% 4% 2,535 25% 3%
-7% -11% -7% -1%
Bulkers
25/50,000dwt 50/80,000dwt 80/150,000dwt 150,000dwt
A1 B C A1 B C A1 B C A1 B C
1991 286 26% 368 27% 439 27% 411 26%
1992 300 24% 5% 386 25% 5% 460 24% 5% 431 24% 5%
1993 308 25% 3% 403 26% 4% 485 25% 5% 451 25% 5%
1994 315 26% 2% 420 28% 4% 510 28% 5% 470 27% 4%
1995 325 27% 3% 443 30% 5% 528 29% 4% 489 29% 4%
1996 335 27% 3% 454 30% 2% 538 29% 2% 508 29% 4%
1997 345 26% 3% 468 30% 3% 555 30% 3% 524 29% 3%
1998 352 26% 2% 475 29% 1% 560 29% 1% 535 29% 2%
21% 26% 25% 27%
   A1: Daily repair and maintenance cost in USD per day
   A2: Annual repair and maintenance cost in ,000USD per day
     B: Percentage of the cost in the daily operating cost
     C: Annually fluctuation of cost
Table 10. Repairs and maintenance cost for bulkers and tankers.
Source: Compiled by Drewry, 1998b and Ocean Shipping Consultants.
In tankers, on the other hand, the total amount is higher because of the more stringent
operating environment. As a matter of fact, the total amount daily spent for repairs and
maintenance has declined and it accounts for -7% during the last 8 years. Looking at the
last four years the cost has increased annually at a low rate of about 2%. However, the
sharp decline in 1994 and the stable situation in 1995 have resulted in the total negative
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increase of this cost in tankers. Finally, as a cost, it represents the 25% on average for all
the sizes and has declined by 1% since the beginning of the decade.
The increase of this expenditure in the early 90s has an explanation back in the 80s,
where both markets had experienced a simultaneous slump. During that period the
expenses associated with the repairs and maintenance were minimised as a measure to
stay buoyant in the low freight level market of that period. The consequent improvement
of the markets, in terms of freight rates, in the beginning of the 90s resulted in the
increase of expenditures for this cost category. Later, after the first half of the decade,
the rate of increase decelerated as the vessels’ maintenance plan was back in black.
Another factor, which had influenced shipowners’ eagerness to increase the expenditure
associated with repairs and maintenance, was the fact that the rise of the prices in the
yards was slower than the demand. Later, when the demand was gone the yards reduced
their prices sharply in order to maintain the same utilisation factor. The later resulted in
the marginal increase of the repairs and maintenance cost in the second half of the 90s
(Drewry, 1998a,b and Ocean Shipping Consultants, 1998).
3.1.3 Supplies and Lubricants
The principal stores and supplies are the marine and deck stores, the engine stores and
the steward’s stores. The cost of provision of all these supplies and the lubricants in the
last 8 years has declined by 6% on average for all the sizes of vessels (see table 11). It is
remarkable that one year the increase of the cost is around 2% and when, the following
year, the prices decline the decrease is more significant at the level of –5%. The result of
the constant decline through the years and the fluctuations, year by year, have resulted in
the almost stable contribution of 13% of this cost in the daily operating cost of the
vessel.
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The bottom line from this decrease is economy for the shipowners. The decrease has its
roots in the depressed market of the supplies and the spare parts. On the other hand,
luboil market follows the fluctuation of the oil market and its refined products, as
lubricants are an oil product. However, leaving aside the short-term distortions of the
prices, in the long terms the prices have been stable for almost all the decade (Drewry,
1998a).
45,000dwt 95,000dwt 150,000dwt 280,000dwt
Cost pd A B Cost pd A B Cost pd A B Cost pd A B
1991 810 14% 835 13% 865 12% 1,370 14%
1992 765 13% -6% 795 11% -5% 820 10% -5% 1,300 12% -5%
1993 755 13% -1% 780 11% -2% 810 10% -1% 1,275 12% -2%
1994 810 15% 7% 835 13% 7% 865 12% 7% 1,355 14% 6%
1995 765 14% -6% 795 13% -5% 820 12% -5% 1,300 14% -4%
1996 780 14% 2% 810 13% 2% 835 12% 2% 1,330 14% 2%
1997 740 13% -5% 765 12% -6% 795 11% -5% 1,260 13% -5%
1998 755 13% 2% 780 12% 2% 810 11% 2% 1,275 13% 1%
-6% -6% -6% -7%
A: the percentage of cost in the total operating cost,
B: the annual fluctuation of the cost,
Cost per day in USD.
TABLE 11. Daily stores and lubs cost for different tanker sizes, 1991-1998
Source: Drewry, 1998b
3.1.4 Capital cost
Getting started the analysis with the cost of the newly built bulk carriers, one can
observe in the table 12 that their nominal costs have declined almost by 11%. The higher
decline of price written down, that is 17%, was for the smaller vessels of 25/50,000dwt.
The lowest decline, 5%, was for the bigger bulkers of over 150,000dwt.
The total reduction for the capital charges is higher than the reduction in the price of a
newly built bulk carrier and it was on average at 15% for the last 7 years. The highest
and the lowest reduction incurred in the same categories of ship sizes as in the case of
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the price of the newbuildings, where the average reduction accounted for 21% and 9%
respectively.
25/50000dwt
Newbuilding Daily Capital Second hand Daily Capital
Year Price A Charge A Value A Charge A
1990 23.8 8,280 12.7 5,893
1992 24.1 1% 8,387 1% 14 10% 6,496 10%
1994 19.8 -18% 6,890 -18% 15.5 11% 7,208 11%
1995 20.4 3% 7,099 3% 17.6 14% 8,184 14%
1996 18.9 -7% 6,314 -11% 14.7 -16% 6,555 -20%
1997 19.6 4% 6,548 4% 13.5 -8% 6,020 -8%
-17% -21% 10% 7%
50/80000dwt
1990 30.3 10,544 19.5 9,048
1992 30.1 -1% 10,475 -1% 20.5 5% 9,512 5%
1994 27.1 -10% 9,431 -10% 19.2 -6% 8,928 -6%
1995 27.9 3% 9,709 3% 22.7 18% 10,556 18%
1996 28.3 1% 9,454 -3% 25.5 12% 11,147 6%
1997 27.5 -3% 9,187 -3% 19.5 -24% 8,695 -22%
-9% -13% 6% 1%
100/150000dwt
1990 44.8 15,590 29.4 13,642
1992 43.2 -4% 15,034 -4% 30.5 4% 14,152 4%
1994 39.7 -8% 13,816 -8% 25.7 -16% 11,951 -16%
1995 39.6 0% 13,781 0% 29.1 13% 13,532 13%
1996 40.9 3% 13,663 -1% 23.1 -21% 10,300 -24%
1997 39.7 -3% 13,262 -3% 22.9 -1% 10,211 -1%
-12% -16% -20% -23%
150000+dwt
1990 47.5 16,530 30.4 14,106
1992 45.9 -3% 15,973 -3% 30.9 2% 14,338 2%
1994 42.5 -7% 14,790 -7% 29 -6% 13,485 -6%
1995 42.3 0% 14,720 0% 32 10% 14,880 10%
1996 45.3 7% 15,133 3% 27.5 -14% 12,262 -18%
1997 44.9 -1% 15,000 -1% 27.6 0% 12,307 0%
-5% -9% -8% -11%
Newbuilding prices in million USD, Second hand prices in million USD,
Daily capital charges in USD, A: the annual fluctuation.
Table 12. Bulkers’ capital cost.
Source: Compiled by Drewry 1998a
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The demolition of the prices in bulkers’ newbuilding market was due to the world
economic slump and the subsequent collapse of the freight rates in the late 1996. The
poor returns had forced the shipowners to be reluctant in ordering new capacity, while
the yards, in an effort to fill the remaining capacity, had reduced their prices (Ocean
Shipping Consultants, 1998).
However, the situation in the second hand market is somehow different. For instance,
the price in the 100,000dwt and over has declined by almost 14%, while in the sector of
handy to panamax size bulkers the prices have seen an increase of 8% through the years
on average. In the latter category the capital charges have been risen, albeit not sharply
in all the sizes.
More detailed, in the panamax size vessels the increase in the capital charges accounts
for the marginal 1% and in the handy sector the increase is 7%. On the contrary, in the
bigger bulkers of 100-150,000dwt, where the nominal prices have fallen, the daily
capital charges have declined more sharply than the prices by 23%, while for the vessels
of 150,000dwt and over their daily capital charges have declined by 11%.
By analysing the influential factors of the second hand market in bulk carriers, one can
clearly see that in the early 90s the situation was buoyant, because of the prevailing
circumstances in the end of 80s and the seasonal peaks of the early 90s. Unfortunately, a
combination of oversupply and a nosedive of BFI in 1995 resulted in the collapse of the
prices in the second hand market (Drewry, 1998a and Ocean Shipping Consultants,
1998).
The tanker market, however, has two different faces; significant decreases in most
newbuildings sectors and rise of prices in the second hand market. In details, at the end
of 1996 the newly built tankers were costing 15% lower, on average, in comparison with
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1991. The lowest written down decrease of 2% was in the VLCC size vessels, while the
highest decline was in the suezmax sector, that is 27%.
PRODUCTS TANKER NEWBUILDING AND SECONDHAND CAPITAL COST
Newbuilding Daily capital Secondhand Daily capital
Year Price A Charge A Value A Charges A
1991 37 10,713 - -
1992 33 -11% 9,555 -11% - -
1993 31 -6% 8,975 -6% - -
1994 32.5 5% 9,410 5% 23 7,225
1995 33.9 4% 9,815 4% 22.5 -2% 7,068 -2%
1996 33 -3% 9,555 -3% 24.5 9% 7,696 9%
-10% -10% 7% 7%
AFRAMAX NEWBUILDING AND SECONDHAND CAPITAL COST
1991 52 15,056 - -
1992 47 -10% 13,068 -13% - -
1993 44.3 -6% 12,826 -2% - -
1994 41.1 -7% 11,900 -7% 33.2 10,429
1995 43.5 6% 12,595 6% 34.5 4% 10,838 4%
1996 42 -3% 12,160 -3% 35 1% 10,995 1%
-20% -20% 5% 5%
SUEZMAX NEWBUILDING AND SECONDHAND CAPITAL COST
1991 70 20,267 37 11,623
1992 62 -11% 17,951 -11% 36 -3% 11,309 -3%
1993 56 -10% 16,214 -10% 34.5 -4% 10,838 -4%
1994 53 -5% 15,345 -5% 34 -1% 10,681 -1%
1995 54.3 2% 15,722 2% 35.5 4% 11,152 4%
1996 52.5 -3% 15,200 -3% 42 18% 13,194 18%
-27% -27% 14% 14%
150000dwt NEWBUILDING AND SECONDHAND CAPITAL COST
1994 84.3 24,407 50 15,707
1995 84.5 0% 24,465 0% 52 4% 16,335 4%
1996 83 -2% 24,031 -2% 58 12% 18,220 12%
-2% -2% 16% 16%
Newbuilding prices in million USD,
Secondhand values in million USD,
Daily capital charge in USD,
A: the annual fluctuation.
Table 13. Tankers’ capital cost.
Source: Compiled by Drewry, 1998a.
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The daily capital charge follows, in percentage, the reduction of the prices (see table 13).
The reduction in the price is the result of the increased capacity in the South Korean
yards as well as because of the severe competition among the yards in the Far East
(Drewry, 1998a).
On the contrary, the second hand market of tankers has increased by 11% and the
highest increase, that is 16%, was noticed in the VLCCs, while the lowest was noticed in
the aframax size tanker vessels. The percentage of increase in the price of second hand
tankers coincides with the percentage of the increase in the daily capital cost for these
vessels (see table 13). The written down increase was a reflection of firmer rates and
expectations for even greater potential earnings (Drewry, 1998a).
3.1.5 Bunkering cost
In the long terms, the bunker prices follow the evolution of prices in the crude oil and
other petroleum products. However, in the short terms the local prevailing circumstances
can lead to a situation where the bunker prices and the crude oil prices are out of step.
The local prevailing circumstances means the regional supply and demand equation,
where the bargaining power of the supply side is dependent on the availability of crude
oil in the region and the refining capacity of the local refineries.
The level of prices is also affected locally by the competition among local players and
consequently by the number of them. Another important influential factor in the local
competition and ultimately in the local pricing is the mean of delivering the bunkers. Is
it done off shore or in the port? If the bunkers are delivered in a port, is the port
designated only for bunkering purposes? (Drewry, 1998a).
All these factors described above influenced the regional markets and as a result the
price of fuel oil has fluctuated significantly since 1990. During the period 1990-1993 the
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prices were falling, reaching the trough of the period studied. Since 1993 the prices have
constantly risen. Therefore, the average fluctuation of prices is positive and accounts for
7%.
Arabian Gulf NW Europe
FO A MDO A FO A MDO A
1990 115 212 105 191
1991 102 -11% 209 -1% 87 -17% 174 -9%
1992 90 -12% 207 -1% 88 1% 161 -7%
1993 80 -11% 208 0% 73 -17% 151 -6%
1994 90 13% 204 -2% 88 21% 133 -12%
1995 100 11% 182 -11% 100 14% 141 6%
1996 111 11% 211 16% 111 11% 178 26%
0% 1% 12% -2%
US Gulf SE Asia
1990 104 201 112 213
1991 78 -25% 174 -13% 96 -14% 196 -8%
1992 81 4% 163 -6% 87 -9% 204 4%
1993 75 -7% 160 -2% 78 -10% 157 -23%
1994 83 11% 148 -8% 88 13% 142 -10%
1995 96 16% 149 1% 100 14% 148 4%
1996 109 14% 188 26% 111 11% 193 30%
11% -2% 3% -2%
FO: fuel oil, MDO: marine diesel oil, A: annual fluctuation,
Figures in USD per ton.
Table 14. Fuel oil and diesel oil prices in selected areas.
Source: Compiled by Drewry, 1998a.
The price evolution of the more expensive marine diesel oil (mdo) follows the same
pattern as the fuel oil, the only difference is that the trough in the mdo prices was
recorded in 1994. Since then the prices have risen, however the total average fluctuation
of mdo is negative and it accounts for 1%.
In the analysed period, the savings in the bunker expenses do not come from the price
evolution. During the last decade the vessels are equipped with engines with drastically
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lower consumption in fuel oil. In comparison with the vessels built in the 70s the
reduction in the daily consumption of fuel oil for the vessels built in the 90s, is more
than 20% in all the size and type of vessel categories (examples are given in table 15).
Moreover, comparing the consumption of fuel oil between a VLCC built in the 70s and a
VLCC built in the 90s the difference reaches the astonishing 62%. However, it should be
cited the fact that the earlier VLCCs were turbine powered.
Bulk Carriers Tankers
Service Service
Panamax FO pd A Speed VLCC FO pd A Speed
Mid 1970s type 45 14,5 260,000dwt-1970s
built
170 12
B&W Mk.V (1990s) 34 -24% 14 280,000dwt-1990s
built
64 -62% 14
Cape Clean
1970s built, 120,000dwt 65 14,5 40,000dwt-1980s
built
35 14
1990s built, 150,000dwt 52 -20% 14,5 40,000dwt-1999s
built
27 -23% 14
Daily consumption in tones, A: the percentage of change, Speed: in knots
Table 15: Comparison of daily consumption.
Source: Compiled by Drewry, 1998a.
3.1.6 Port costs and canal charges
Port and canal dues are a fundamental consideration for any shipowner attempting to
define voyage costs. The recently environmental pressure and the infrastructure
development in the ports resulted in the rise of the associated charges. On the other
hand, the major canals, Suez and Panama, have experienced mixed fortunes in terms of
traffic figures and as a consequence tolls have been reduced or frozen. Explicitly, the
Suez Canal authority in an effort to revive demand reduced the tolls, while in Panama
the reverse was true (Drewry, 1998a).
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3.1.7 Summing up the international costs
25/50,000dwt Capital
H&M P&I R&M Fuel oil Cost Total pd A
1991 518 148 784 2,318
1992 715 208 822 2,744 8,387 12,876
1993 595 222 844 2,672
1994 405 173 863 2,504 6,890 10,835 -16%
1995 348 159 890 3,005 7,099 11,501 6%
1996 301 156 918 3,354 6,314 11,043 -4%
1997 277 159 945 2,563 6,548 10,492 -5%
1998 299 164 964 2,260 -19%
50/80,000dwt
1991 679 181 1,008 2,815
1992 951 260 1,058 3,346 1,0475 16,089
1993 808 301 1,104 3,253
1994 510 244 1,151 3,063 9,431 14,398 -11%
1995 405 214 1,214 3,676 9,709 15,218 6%
1996 342 216 1,244 4,096 9,454 15,353 1%
1997 310 225 1,282 3,162 9,187 14,165 -8%
1998 356 247 1,301 2,785 -12%
100/150,000dwt
1991 888 274 1,203 3,880
1992 1290 397 1,260 4,636 15,034 22,618
1993 1164 460 1,329 4,498
1994 825 397 1,397 4,261 13,816 20,696 -8%
1995 663 334 1,447 5,115 13,781 21,340 3%
1996 647 329 1,474 5,686 13,663 21,798 2%
1997 551 307 1,521 4,188 13,262 19,828 -9%
1998 570 315 1,534 3,685 -12%
150,000dwt+
1991 932 288 1,126 5,158
1992 1301 397 1,181 6,184 15,973 25,036
1993 1137 452 1,236 5,992
1994 784 373 1,288 5,700 14,790 22,934 -8%
1995 630 301 1,340 6,841 14,720 23,832 4%
1996 581 290 1,392 7,594 15,133 24,990 5%
1997 496 279 1,436 6,069 15,000 23,280 -7%
1998 570 290 1,466 5,335 -6%
Figures in USDpd, Capital cost has been calculated for a newbuilding,
A: the percentage of change.
Table 16. Total international cost for newly built Bulk carrier per day.
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Source: Compiled by Drewry 1998 b, Ocean Shipping Consultants 1998
Without considering the stores and lubricants expenses, where the former have declined
and the latter are stable, during the analysed period, nor the port and canal dues, where
the former have increased and the latter have experienced mixed fortunes, the sum up of
all the international costs, associated with the operation of bulk carriers, gives us the
following results (see table 16):
· An average decrease of the costs of 12% on average for all the size of bulk
carriers.
· The decline of the international cost was greater in the smaller bulkers and
was accounted for 16%.
· The international cost for the bigger bulk carriers has declined to a level
lower than the average of all sizes and accounts for 9%.
In tankers, the same was repeated, but this time from all the international costs were not
taken into consideration not only the port and canal dues but also the bunkers. For the
port and canal dues is valid what had been written for the bulkers, while it shall be
mentioned the fact that the bunkers have seen an increase of 7% during the analysed
period. The results can be summed up as follows (see also table 17):
· As the size of the analysed vessels is getting bigger the percentage of decline
in the total international cost is getting higher, where in the Suezmax size
vessels the decline in the total international cost reaches the 24%. In this
conclusion the VLCCs are not considered, because of the short available
data.
· On average the total international cost has declined by 14%.
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 "45,000dwt" Capital
H&M P&I R&M S&L Charges Total pd A
1991 670 165 1,300 810 10,713 13,658
1992 930 235 1,315 765 9,555 12,800 -6%
1993 795 275 1,330 755 8,975 12,130 -5%
1994 605 300 1,110 810 9,410 12,235 1%
1995 465 315 1,110 765 9,815 12,470 2%
1996 450 330 1,135 780 9,555 12,250 -2%
1997 465 345 1,165 740 -10%
1998 480 355 1,190 755
"95,000dwt"
1991 810 235 1,780 835 15,056 18,716
1992 1125 330 1,810 795 13,068 17,128 -8%
1993 960 400 1,820 780 12,826 16,786 -2%
1994 725 440 1,440 835 11,900 15,340 -9%
1995 575 450 1,440 795 12,595 15,855 3%
1996 560 480 1,480 810 12,160 15,490 -2%
1997 575 505 1,505 765 -18%
1998 590 520 1,550 780
"150,000dwt"
1991 1040 285 2,150 865 20,267 24,607
1992 1450 425 2,180 820 17,951 22,826 -7%
1993 1235 505 2,190 810 16,214 20,954 -8%
1994 905 535 1,820 865 15,345 19,470 -7%
1995 725 550 1,835 820 15,722 19,652 1%
1996 715 575 1,865 835 15,200 19,190 -2%
1997 725 600 1,905 795 -24%
1998 755 615 1,975 810
"280,000dwt"
1991 1715 505 2,600 1,370
1992 2400 740 2,685 1,300
1993 2040 890 2,740 1,275
1994 1630 975 2,330 1,355 24,407 30,697
1995 1300 1000 2,355 1,300 24,465 30,420 -1%
1996 1285 1055 2,395 1,330 24,031 30,096 -1%
1997 1300 1110 2,450 1,260 -2%
1998 1345 1135 2,535 1,275
Figures in USD, A: the percentage of change, Capital charges were calculated
For a newly built vessel.
Table 17. Total international cost for newly built tanker per day.
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Source: Compiled by Drewry 1998a,b.
3.2 National Costs
In this part, the costs influenced by the flying flag will be cited and analysed. The
objective is to discover the most influential cost to the total national cost. In other words,
the cost which has forced the shipowners to flag out their vessels, searching a more
economical and inexpensive flag than the Greek. The analysis commences by analysing
the cost of manning with national seafarers and continues by analysing the registry cost.
Finally, this is concluded with the presentation of the administrative expenses.
3.2.1 Manning cost
Before going into the analysis of the Greek seafarers cost, it is important to cite what is
the perception about the cost of manning in international level for the decade of 90s. The
commencement of the 90s coincides with the collapse of the former Eastern Block. The
collapse resulted in the release of a large number of qualified personnel in the labour
market and the subsequent decline of the crewing cost.
In the mid 90s while the shipping market was recovering, the crewing cost began to
show real increase. However, the increasingly supply of seafarers in the market served to
restrain the acceleration of the nominal rates. A good example of increasing supply is the
case of Filipino crews, where in 1993 the registered Filipino seafarers were 316.501 and
until 1996 that number had increased by 31,7%. In 1996 the number of registered
Filipino seafarers was 416.882, placing a downward pressure in the average crewing
cost (Ocean Shipping Consultants, 1998).
Despite the aforementioned negative factors the crewing cost has exhibited a stable
increase during the whole period. In the tankers the total increase during the period
1991-1998 accounts for 11%, with an annual increase of 1,5% on average (see table 13).
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On the other hand, the increase in the bulkers can not be characterised marginal as it is
in the case of the tankers, because the cost was increasing annually by 5,5% and finally
it accounts for 39% during the analysed period (see table 18).
Manning cost for
tankers
45,000dwt 95,000dwt 150,000dwt 280,000dwt
A1 B C A1 B C A1 B C A1 B C
1991 2050 36% 2100 32% 2100 29% 2140 22%
1992 2100 35% 2% 2150 31% 2% 2150 27% 2% 2190 20% 2%
1993 2130 36% 1% 2180 31% 1% 2180 28% 1% 2225 21% 2%
1994 2145 38% 1% 2195 34% 1% 2195 31% 1% 2240 23% 1%
1995 2175 40% 1% 2210 36% 1% 2210 32% 1% 2260 24% 1%
1996 2205 40% 1% 2230 36% 1% 2230 32% 1% 2280 24% 1%
1997 2260 41% 2% 2285 36% 2% 2285 32% 2% 2335 24% 2%
1998 2315 41% 2% 2345 36% 3% 2345 32% 3% 2395 24% 3%
12% 11% 11% 11%
Manning cost for
bulkers
25/50000dwt 50/80000dwt 80/15000dwt 150000dwt+
A2 B C A2 B C A2 B C A2 B C
1991 476 42% 550 40% 629 38% 581 37%
1992 501 40% 5% 579 38% 5% 662 35% 5% 612 34% 5%
1993 529 42% 6% 611 39% 6% 698 36% 5% 660 36% 8%
1994 563 47% 6% 649 44% 6% 741 40% 6% 695 40% 5%
1995 583 48% 4% 673 46% 4% 767 42% 4% 730 43% 5%
1996 630 50% 8% 727 48% 8% 831 44% 8% 799 45% 9%
1997 690 52% 10% 768 49% 6% 856 46% 3% 827 46% 4%
1998 715 52% 4% 795 49% 4% 885 46% 3% 860 46% 4%
42% 38% 35% 40%
A1: the daily manning cost in USD
A2: The annual manning cost in thousands of USD
  B: The manning cost as a percentage of the operating cost
  C: Annual increase of the manning cost
Table 18. Manning cost for bulkers and tankers.
 Source: Compiled by Drewry 1998b and Ocean Shipping Consultants, 1998.
On the other hand, during the same period the increase of the Greek seafarers follows a
different or to be more accurate, a faster track of rise. During the period 1991-1995 the
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annual rise of salaries was higher than 10%. The sharp growth of salaries during the first
five years of the decade was granted as a motivation to attract people back in the
seafaring profession after the large redundancies of the 80s. Additionally, the inflation
rate in the country was high. Therefore, there was a need for annual increase of salaries,
higher than the inflation rate, in order that they remain attractive.
Since 1995 a deceleration in the rise of salaries has been noticed. The acceleration was
eased off because of three main reasons. First, the harmonisation of the Greek economy
with the other European economies has resulted in the constant decline of the inflation
rate. As a result, the salary rises have been following the level of the inflation rate.
Second, the salaries reached the required attractive level and simultaneously became
very costly for the shipowners. Finally, the rate of entrance in the maritime profession
was considered sufficient for the shipowners needs.
Chief Officer; Basic wage
GRD GRD/1 USD USD
1998 287.130 277 1036.57
6% 4%
1997 270.875 271 999.5387
8% -2%
1996 251.390 247 1017.773
9% 5%
1995 230.635 237 973.1435
11% 12%
1994 207.780 240 865.75
14% 18%
1993 182.265 249 731.988
30% -9%
1991 140.245 175 801.4
Total 78% 29%
Table 19. Chief officer’s basic wage during 1991-99 and its exchange in USD.
Source: Compiled by Syllogiki Symvassi Ergassias 1991-1998 and Nordstedts Tryckeri
AB, 1999.
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However, by exchanging the Greek drachma to US dollar (table 19) one can have some
very interesting observations:
· Only in 1994 and 1995 the increase in dollars was higher than the increase in
drachmas.
· In the two-year period of 1991-93, while the increase in drachmas was 30%,
expressing the salaries in dollars, there was a decrease of the cost by 9%.
· Another year of negative increase, in dollars, was in 1997, where in drachmas the
increase accounts for 8%.
· Lastly, in the years 1996 and 1998 the nominal increase in dollars was lower than
the nominal increase in drachmas.
Therefore, albeit in Greek drachma the total increase of the salaries accounts for 78%,
expressing the salaries in US dollars the nominal increase is 29%.
However, the 29% increase in salaries is much higher than the increase in the salaries of
the cheaper crews. During the same period the International Transport Federation (ITF)
has given only an increase of 19% in the Total Crew Cost agreements (Holmer, 1999).
The observation is that the rate of increase for the vessels flying the home flag is much
higher than the one of their competitor flying flags of convenience.
Master C/O 2nd Off Ch. Eng 2nd Eng 3rd Eng Bosun AB Ch. Cook
Greek 8,558 5,620 4,347 8,304 5,821 4,558 3,553 2,847 4,294
156% 159% 159% 164% 168% 171% 199% 187% 262% 181%
Filipino 3,345 2,168 1,678 3,149 2,168 1,678 1,187 991 1,187
Table 20. Contrasting the salaries of Greek seafarers with the Filipino seafarers.
Source: Drewry, 1998a and four major Greek shipowning companies, 1999.
Moreover, in the table 20 a comparison between the salaries of Greek seafarers and their
Filipino counterparts is exhibited schematically. The result of the comparison is that the
Greek seafarers are on average 181% more expensive than the Filipinos. Bearing this
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fact and the higher rate of increase in the Greek salaries in mind one can conclude that
the pre-existing cost difference has been further enlarged during this decade. Ultimately
the total manning cost for the vessels flying the home flag has increased.
Furthermore, the table 21 is an effort to visualise the difference in the total cost between
the Greek seafarers and their Filipino counterparts. The monthly total cost of a fully
Greek crew is 71,093$. On the other hand, the total cost for fully Filipino crew is
26,614$ monthly and comparable with a fully Greek crew is 167% less expensive.
However, according to the latest amendments of the Greek manning rules, there is no
requirement for a fully Greek crew. The last column of the table 21 presents the total
cost of a mixed Greek and Filipino crew. The results are that the mixed crew is more
expensive by 114% than a fully Filipino crew compliment. Admittedly, the difference is
still high, despite the partially use of Filipinos, because the Greek compliment accounts,
in the total amount, 86% of the total crew cost.
Filipino Greek 9Greeks+8Filipino
Master 3,345 8,558 8,558 0
C/O 2,168 5,620 5,620 0
2nd Off(2) 3,356 8,694 4,347 1,678
Bosun 1,187 3,553 3,553 0
AB(3) 2,973 8,541 2,847 1,982
Ch.Eng 3,149 8,304 8,304 0
2nd Eng 2,168 5,821 5,821 0
3rd Eng 1,678 4,548 4,558 0
Electrician 1,678 4,619 0 1,678
Oiler(3) 2,973 8,541 0 2,973
Ch.Cook 1,187 4,294 4,294 0
Steward 752 0 0 752 Total
Total 26,614 71,093 47,902 9063 =56,965
Salaries in USD.
(for 1998)
167% 84% 16% 114%
Table 21. Various total crew cost calculations.
Source: Drewry, 1998a and four major Greek Shipowning companies, 1999.
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3.2.2 The cost of Greek registry
The cost of a registry is measured according to the manning requirements, the taxation
regime and the level of annual fees. The manning cost under the Greek flag has already
been exhibited and analysed. The remaining cost will be calculated in this part.
However, by comparing only the annual fees and all the other related cost, the
comparison is meaningless, because the actual size of the cost is not either obvious or
straightforward, as it is usually expressed in dollars per gross tonnage or net tonnage.
Therefore, by chance a vessel was selected and its annual registry cost under the Greek
flag was calculated. For your guidance, the vessel is a 17.000gt/10.500nt product tanker
employed in worldwide trade. In addition, the comparison of the cost under the Greek
flag with other flags was necessary. For this comparison the three major choices of the
Greek shipowners when they fly from the home registry were selected. Those are the
Cypriot, the Liberian and the Panamanian registries.
The results, which are exhibited with details in table 22, are presenting that under the
Greek flag the annual tonnage taxes are much higher than the second more expensive
flag. The second most expensive flag, in the comparison, is the Liberian. It is 276% less
expensive than the Greek. The cheapest flag of the comparison is the Cypriot flag and it
is 537% less expensive than the Greek.
Furthermore, in the introductory paragraph of this part, it was mentioned that except the
annual fees and the other charges, there is another important factor in the selection of the
flag. This factor is the taxation regime of the country. The taxation regimes of the
registries that were selected to be compared with the Greek, including the Greek, is as
follows:
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Registry Tax Form
Annual
taxes
depend
upon
Amount in
USD (for
the specific
vessel)
Total
payment in
USD
Other
payments
Greek Tonnage
taxes
Age of the
vessel
0,93 per grt 15,810 No registration
fees. There are
only minimal
documentation
dues and other
small charges.
Cypriot Tonnage
taxes
Grt 770+1,709 2,479 Registration fees
1,800$, plus other
small charges.
Liberian Tonnage
taxes
Nrt O,4per nrt 4,200 Registration from
foreign registry
2,500$, plus
documentation
dues and other
small charges.
Panamanian Tonnage
taxes
nrt/grt O,10/nrt+
3,000
4,050 3,OOO$
registration fee,
plus
documentation
dues and other
charges.
Table 22. Cost comparison among registries
Source: Compiled by Lucca, 1997.
· Cyprus: profits generated by Cypriot vessel or dividends received from Cypriot
Shipping companies are exempted from taxation. A Cypriot shipping company is
any shipping company registered in Cyprus belonging exclusively to non-residents.
The company is registered as a private company with limited liability under the
provisions of the Cypriot Shipping Law.
· Liberia: there are no corporate or individual taxes in Liberia to non-resident
corporations, including shipowning companies.
· Panama: The fiscal legislation in Panama taxes only persons and companies whose
sources of income arise or derive from activities within the territory of Panama, and
therefore there are no income or withholding taxes to non resident companies.
· Greece: Any foreign enterprise engaged in the administration, operation, chartering,
insurance, average adjusting, or ship brokerage of ships over 1,000grt under the
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Greek or foreign flag is exempted from any taxes on their income, provided they
cover their operation expenses in Greece by the equivalent of at least 50,000$
annually (Lucca, 1997).
3.2.3 Administration and overheads
Tankers
45000dwt 95000dwt 150000dwt 280000dwt
A1 B C A1 B C A1 B C A1 B C
1991 660 11% 755 12% 890 12% 1415 15%
1992 660 11% 0% 755 11% 0% 890 11% 0% 1445 13% 2%
1993 685 10% 4% 820 12% 9% 960 12% 8% 1370 13% -5%
1994 615 11% -10% 755 12% -8% 810 11% -16% 1300 13% -5%
1995 550 10% -11% 660 11% -13% 700 10% -14% 1205 13% -7%
1996 590 11% 7% 700 11% 6% 750 11% 7% 1235 13% 2%
1997 605 11% 3% 720 11% 3% 770 11% 3% 1265 13% 2%
1998 620 11% 2% 735 11% 2% 785 11% 2% 1295 13% 2%
-5% -1% -10% -8%
Bulkers
25/50000dwt 50/80000dwt 80/150000dwt 150000+dwt
A2 B C A2 B C A2 B C A2 B C
1991 116 10% 132 10% 143 9% 140 9%
1992 117 9% 1% 133 9% 1% 145 8% 1% 141 8% 1%
1993 118 9% 1% 134 9% 1% 148 8% 2% 145 8% 3%
1994 120 10% 2% 135 9% 1% 150 8% 1% 150 9% 3%
1995 121 10% 1% 135 9% 0% 150 8% 0% 150 9% 0%
1996 122 10% 1% 135 9% 0% 151 8% 1% 151 9% 1%
1997 125 9% 2% 139 9% 3% 155 8% 3% 156 9% 3%
1998 130 10% 4% 145 9% 4% 160 8% 3% 161 9% 3%
12% 10% 11% 14%
A1: Daily cost of administration in USD
A2: Annual cost of administration in USD
B: The administration cost as a percentage of the total operating cost
C: Annual fluctuation of the administration cost
Table 23. Administration cost for tankers and bulkers.
Source: Compiled by Drewry, 1998b and Ocean Shipping Consultants, 1998.
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It becomes virtually impossible to derive an average historical data series on
administration and overheads for different ship types without effectively tailoring to the
results of an individual company. Therefore, the yardstick will be once more the average
cost indices of the industry, where there is a far from clear pattern of the current market.
In the table 23 it is cited the total cost of administration for both bulkers and tankers and
for various sizes of each type of vessels. The observations are as follows:
a. Tankers:
· The average total decrease of the administration cost in all the sizes is 6%,
· Since 1996 there is a tendency for increase in the administration cost, albeit
marginal,
· The highest decrease was observed in the two-year period 1994-95.
b. Bulkers
· The total average increase of the administration cost in all the sizes of bulkers is
12%,
· In all the categories, there is an annual marginal increase of the administration
cost of about 2%.
3.2.4 A sum up of the national cost
Although the national cost can not be summarised in a table as in the case of the
international cost, conclusions can be drawn. Getting started from the cost which has
the biggest share in the pie of cost, the manning cost, one can conclude that the vessels
manned with cheaper crews have a competitive advantage over the Greek flagged
vessels during the periods of recession of the shipping market, which are, notably,
longer than the periods of prosperity.
Secondly, the results of the analysis related to the administrative cost have mixed
fortunes. In tankers there is a decline, while in the bulkers there is a stable increase.
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However, as a cost, it is not the one that will offer the competitive advantage in a
company during the recessions, because it accounts only for 10% of the total operating
cost.
Finally, the Greek Law give a chance to the Greek Shipping companies to avoid
corporate taxation. However, the Greek tonnage taxation is much higher than the
tonnage taxation of the flags of convenience. At a first glance the total amount which is
accrued is small, because the vessel used in the comparison has small dead weight. The
amount that shall be paid for a bigger vessel is a considerable one.
3.3 Concluding the chapter
To conclude, the analysis of the vessel’s associated costs reveals that the most expensive
cost for the Greek flagged vessels is the manning. The international cost has been
declined on average for both types of vessels by 13%, while in the national costs the
manning, which is the single biggest operating cost, has shown higher rate of increase
than the cost of manning with cheaper crews. The result is that the pre-existing
difference has been further increased. Therefore, the use of Greek seafarers is nowadays
a luxury that they can not simply afford during the market slumps.
Similar cost manning problems have been faced from all the major maritime nations
with strong economies, among others Denmark, Japan and Sweden. Shipowning
companies based in these countries and with belief in the usage of their national
seafarers have taken actions in order to make their vessels competitive in the market and
simultaneously to use chiefly national seafarers. The next chapter aims to present these
individual efforts, which have been done with the co-operation of their national
MARADs.
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CHAPTER 4
 Case studies
Chapter 3 was aiming to reveal the cause of the loss of competitiveness of the Greek
flagged vessels and the figure of blame was pointed to the crewing cost. Similar
problems have been faced from other maritime nations, earlier than Greece, due to their
faster economic growth. Therefore, they have initialised various projects in order to
reduce the manning cost and recover the competitiveness of their fleets in the
international market where they compete. From all those projects, three have been
chosen to be presented as case studies in this chapter and each one has its uniqueness.
The first project, the Project Ship, was selected because the development of high
technology during the project resulted in the sharp reduction of manning level and the
subsequent reduction in manning cost. Furthermore, the 12-man crew concept was
selected because it suggests another way of crew reduction; through scrutiny of the
organisation and the working patterns on board. The final selected project, the Pioneer
Vessel, was chosen because of the introduction of the dual-purpose crew as a concept to
reduce manning level.
4.1 The Project ship
4.1.1 Project’s launch
In 1987 the Danish Ministry of Industry initiated a project with a two fold aim; the
improvement and strength of the competitiveness not only of Danish shipping, but also
of Danish shipbuilding industry. The mean of accomplishment of this aim was through
the incorporation of all the latest technological conquests in a newly designed vessel.
The project’s participants were a considerable number of Danish companies and
international classification societies. However, the final project was approved by the
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Danish Maritime Authorities (DMA). A year after the initialisation, the project was
concluded and the results were the design of four different types of vessels. They were
designated as A, B, C and D and they were one 7,500dwt chemical tanker, one 7,500dwt
bulk cargo/container vessel and two 10,000dwt bulk cargo/container vessels
respectively.
All of the designs were approved by DMA to be manned with crew of six, while the
minimum requirement for this size of vessels was 18 crewmembers. The main features
of these vessels were in short the one-man port-to-port ship control, vessel’s ability to be
moored alongside with only three men and a range of work savings features.
Nonetheless, the question arisen shortly after the completion of the project was who was
going to undertake to put the project from the desk and drawers to the sea. The answer
came from the Lauritzen Reefers and the Danyard, which both were belonged to the
same group of companies.
On one hand, Danyard had three decades shipbuilding experience by building the
STANDARD FLEX-300 for the Royal Danish Navy. They had delivered ‘til then 40
vessels. Therefore, the shipyard, by building navy vessels, had long experience in
incorporating high technology, and especially electronics, on vessels.
On the other hand, Lauritzen Reefers, as one of the oldest reefer operators, had been in
the forefront of many shipping activities. Therefore, the involvement in the Project Ship
came naturally to the board of directors. In December 1998, they placed confidently the
order to the Danyard for four reefers to be built according to the Project ship concept
(Hansen, 91).
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4.1.2 The realisation of the project and its cost
The favoured size of vessels among the reefer owners at that period was vessels with
capacity of 400,000 cubic feet. On the contrary, Lauritzen decided to build the vessels as
the biggest in their kind with capacity of 765,000 cubic feet. To meet this requirement
Type C had to be enlarged and modified in order to become dedicated reefer vessel. As a
result, Alternative Type C was designed and developed.
Two and a half year after the signing of the contract all of the four vessels were sailing
at the oceans. That is to say, four and a half years after the launch of the programme
from the Ministry of Industry. The lead ship was the “Ditlev Lauritzen”, which was
launched in August 1990. In November of the same year “Ivan Lauritzen” was launched.
The third vessel “Knud Lauritzen” was launched in February,  the following year, and
the order was completed in May 1991 with the delivery of “Jorgen Lauritzen”.
The final dimensions of the vessels, the Alternative Type C, were as follows:
• Length Overall: 164,33m
• Length Between Perpendiculars: 150,6m
• Breadth Moulded: 24m
• Depth Upper Deck, Moulded: 15,7m
• Draught at Summer Load Line: 10m.
Other ship’s particulars were the single screw, the diesel powered engine and the
accommodation in the aft. All holds could alternatively take containers, instead of
pallets, and the total capacity bellow deck was 236 TEU. The deck capacity of
containers was 244 TEU.
The first of the four vessels, “Ditlev Lauritzen”, had a cost of around 50m$ and was
financed by the Denmark’s traditional way of private shares issue, where each investor
had a minimum of 8,330$. Additionally, part of the cost for the development of the
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reefer was covered by the Project Ship research programme (Hansen, 1991 and the
Motor Ship, 1990).
4.1.3 Technologies applied
Although manning reduction is not regulated with international rules and conventions, a
traditional crew in order to be minimised, certain conditions shall be fulfilled. First, the
vessel shall be equipped and designed in such manner as to minimise not only the
workload for the crew but also the risk of accidents and breakdown of equipment.
Second, operational procedures shall be established in order to optimise the efficiency of
the ship and the crew. Accordingly the crew shall be trained adequately, and last but not
least the safety shall not be compromised (Monk, 1991).
In order to fulfil the above conditions, the following technologies, innovations and
features were applied into the Project ship:
Manoeuvrability of the vessel: Due to the fact that arrival and departure from the ports
was considered as one of the most labour intensive operations, because of the use of
tugs, it was necessary to design a vessel capable of entering, berthing and leaving a port,
without the need of harbour tugs. This was succeeded with the combination of a
controllable pitch propeller, bow and stern thrusters and a 25,2 m2 rudder operated
through a 2x35° angle. This combination has given it the possibility to arrive, berth and
depart from the port without the assistance of tugs in winds up to 12m/sec.
Mooring arrangement: Although that the previously described arrangement gives plenty
time for mooring, it would be more advantageous to make the mooring equipment easy
to handle. Therefore, in the Project ship all the drums were tension controlled, so that the
hawsers were automatically adjusted with the changing tide and the load conditions of
the vessel. Moreover, all the winches were remotely controlled from positions on either
side of the vessel, allowing mooring to be performed with one man at each end. Pilot
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ladders and gangways were one man controlled. Anchor handling could be executed
remotely from the bridge by the officer on watch.
Propulsion: there was a need for a robust and reliable engine, where planning and
execution of maintenance should be simple. In addition, it could be valuable if the
engine could run even with one of the cylinders out of order. Therefore, it was selected a
single slow speed, two strokes engine with six cylinders. However, by using a single
engine there was a need for a redundancy in the case of engine break down. This was
solved with the use of a shaft generator, which was connected with the auxiliary
generators and might be driven by them. Hence, it could be used as an alternative
propulsion.
Automation: the most important feature of these vessels was the Integrated Ship Control
(ISC), a system which was developed and manufactured by the Danish company
Lyngsoe Marine a/s. It integrates not only the monitoring and the control of the
machinery, but also the navigation and the manoeuvring of the ship.
Functions, which were carried out ordinarily from the engine control room, could
be carried out from the bridge. The software controlling all the functions was menu
orientated, therefore there was no need for detailed technical knowledge.
Moreover, the pre-planning of the voyage was carried out in a special computer
and at the beginning of each voyage the planned route was loaded to the system and the
execution of the voyage was entrusted to the ISC.
Furthermore, the system also monitored the reactions of the officer on watch
(OOW) and was giving an alarm every time that the OOW did not touch any lever or
button of the console for a specific time period. If the officer on watch did not
acknowledge the alarm, the system was activated an alarm to render assistance. This
alarm system is called dead man’s alarm.
Finally, the ISC operated on a dual data bus and redundancy had been further
enhanced by hard wire back up of essential connections, such as those necessary for
manoeuvring.
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Fire detection and extinguishing: the Project vessels are not more dangerous than other
vessels. However, the low manning level may result in the delayed detection of fire.
Therefore, as a measure to increase safety, fire detectors have been placed in all rooms
as well as manually operated sprinkler system in all living rooms and in the galley.
Training: all crewmembers had an introductory course in order to be familiarised with
the vessel and its equipment. All officers had courses in general computer knowledge
and courses in the computer applications that would be found on board. Finally, deck
officers had received bridge simulator courses at the Danish Maritime Institute. It is
noteworthy that part of the training was requested by the authorities, while the company
initiated the rest.
Maintenance: the officer responsible for the maintenance of the vessel is the Chief
Engineer. Maintenance was planned to be carried out by maintenance companies,
therefore a number of agreements for such services were concluded. Paintwork was
planned to be done in the dry-docking because the applied paint system needed not
require maintenance (Monk, 1991 and Hansen, 1991 and The Motor Ship, 1990).
4.1.4 Evaluation of the Project Ship
The Danish Shipowners’ representative, Mr Damkjaer, says among others in a letter sent
to Lloyd’s List about the Project Ship:
• “…Lauritzen people were the only ones who presented solutions already carried out
to many of the problems which shipping, and in particular West European shipping,
is facing”
• “With the size of the crew of the Project Ship there is a basis for operating shipping
under a national register with a full national crew”
• “The smaller Project Ship crew, which is an operation crew only, reduces the
pressure for the demand for seafarers”
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• “The crews in these ships are confronted with much more challenging tasks, and to a
large extent decisions concerning the daily operations are entrusted to those on
board” (Lloyd’s List, 1991b).
From an economic point of view, in another article of Lloyd’s List the following
comment was found:
• “…While the ships were expensive to build, they are yielding benefits to Lauritzen in
terms of lower operating cost…” (Lloyd’s List, 1991a).
However, these are the evaluations of third parties regarding the success of the Project
Ships. Therefore, the author approached J. Lauritzen a/s, the owner of the Project Ships,
to request their own evaluation for their project. Mr. Claus Pavar, fleet manager in
Lauritzen reefers reverted as follows: “Although very expensive ships to build, the
Project Ships – our ‘Family Class’ – have proved to be efficient with an excellent
performance even with the low manning concept introduced at that time” (Pavar, 1999).
4.2 The 12-man crew project
4.2.1 Rationale of undertaking the crewing project
During 1987 the Transatlantic Ship Management undertook a crew reduction project,
which was aiming to reduce the cost of manning under the Swedish flag. In the
presentation of the project from the Transatlantic Ship Management, the company
presented the followings as the rationale to undertake the project:
• The large scale re-registration of ships to other flags,
• No other advanced Swedish project since 1978 (it was also undertaken by the
same company),
• Several project in progress around them,
• Sweden formerly a leader in the development field,
• Previous projects very successful,
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• The situation in shipping at that period,
• The increased competition,
• The recently introduction of parallel registers (NIS, DIS etc),
• The advanced expertise of Swedish marine personnel,
• The need for changes in crewing regulations,
• Survival (Transatlantic Ship Management AB, 1989a).
However, it was not surprising that Sweden had decided to undertake a crewing
reduction project. It had even considered that the project was undertaken later than it
was expected, since operating cost under the national flag was a longstanding concern
(Seaways, 1989).
The ship chosen for the project was Companion Express, one of the G3-class ro-
ro/container liners operating in the ACL consortium. She was built at Kockum shipyard
and subsequently lengthen in 1987 by 42m to 292m. Companion Express was (and still
is) operating on a liner trade across the North Atlantic Ocean. That is to say, she was
(and still is) involved in voyages with regular port of calls. Some special features for the
Companion Express were (and still are):
• Cargo access arrangement with fully automated hydraulic operation,
• Cell guides on weather deck giving a fully automated lashing free container
handling,
• One man operated mooring equipment fore and aft,
• Powerful thrusters fore and aft with fully automated start-up from the bridge,
• Bridge layout permitting an one man operation also in locks and during
docking manoeuvres,
• All mechanical equipment from engines and on, arranged for optimal
accessibility,
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• Administrative computer based systems for both ship’s internal use and for
cargo (Transatlantic Ship Management AB, 1989b and Seaways, 1989).
4.2.2 Objective and uniqueness of the project
There was a need for reduction of the crewing cost in order to make the Swedish
flagged vessels competitive in the international market. The required reduction in cost
was quantified and set as an objective. The aim was to lower the cost under the Swedish
flag at a level where it would be equal to the cost under the Norwegian International
Registry (NIS).
The mean to lower the crewing cost was the sharp reduction of crew size. Therefore, the
reduction of crew size by 40% was set as the objective of the project. This number was
calculated taking on account the cost under the Swedish flag with crew of 20, 10million
SEK, the cost of the same crew size under the NIS, 4.5 million SEK and the
governmental support package of 2,4 million SEK.This was not possible to be
introduced unconditionally. There was an obligation that safety would not be
compromised and that the operational performance and the social life of the crew would
be maintained at high standards.
The uniqueness of this project was the fact that the reduction in crew was not because of
the extensive use of high tech and the subsequent substitution of manpower by
automation. High tech may has been used, however the 40% reduction was succeeded
after analysing all the tasks which were performed on board. The proposed and
accordingly implemented size of crew was as follows:
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Master 1
Chief Officer 1
2nd Officer 1
3rd Officer 1
Chief Engineer 1
2nd Engineer 1
3rd Engineer 1
AB GP 3
Motorman GP 1
Cook Steward 1
Sum 12
The analysis, which was performed, was the following:
• Calculation of workload,
• Definition of crew core task,
• Definition of crew service tasks,
• Scrutinising of the working methods on board.
It is obvious that every single task on board was put under scrutiny in order to optimise
the use and the results of a small but well trained crew. The results of the analysis were:
• Establishment of a new manning model,
• Operational manual for every defined task,
• Operational manual for a specific round trip.
These manuals were aiming to introduce new organisational patterns and procedures,
where their implementation has resulted in the safe and efficient operation of the vessel
with crew size of 12 (Transatlantic Ship Management 1989 a and b).
4.2.3 Cost/Benefits analysis of the project
 The 12-man concept was borne as an internal project in the Transatlantic Ship
Management AB, however months later became a major input in the “The ship
operation and manning study” project. The latter was a project organised and financed
by the Swedish Shipowners’ Association (SSA). The cost of the internal project was
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GBP40,000 and was later covered by the participation of the company’s experts in the
project launched by the  SSA.
The investments in equipment were covered by the normal operating costs of the vessel.
The total amount spent for this purpose was GBP10,000; an extra helm was bought for
the wheelhouse as well as an extra remote control station for the aft mooring winches to
allow only two men to connect tug lines safely.
The following gives an exact picture of the costs and benefits in GBP per year from the
implementation of the project:
Gross savings in crew cost 400,000
• Increased wages and allowances 40,000
• Improved relief system 5,000
• General Operator certificates 15,000
• Cost of temporarily support crew 20,000    
Net savings in crew costs 320,000
• Extra ordinary cost for repairs and
maintenance including cost for
external service companies 20,000
Net savings in total cost 300,000
It is noteworthy that Transatlantic was even able to negotiate lower hull insurance rates
between 15 and 20% from the Swedish and the Atlantica Clubs (Transatlantic Ship
Management 1989a and b and Seaways, 1989).
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4.2.4 Appraisal of the project
Eleven years after its launch the project still runs, therefore one can conclude that the
project has fulfilled its expectations and objectives.  The company currently operates
five vessels in the cross Atlantic trade. Two of these vessels are manned with the 12-
man crew concept. The other three vessels are manned with a crew of 24 and their
nationality is Filipino.
In an effort to investigate the future of the project, the superintendent of the company
was interviewed. Having discussed all the details of the project, its evolution and
success, he concluded by saying that the project is still running because the concept still
fulfils its initial objective. He supported his statement by saying that the total operating
cost of the vessels manned with 12 Swedish seafarers is equal to the vessels manned
with 24 Filipino seafarers.
4.3 The Pioneer Vessel
4.3.1 Project’s motivators
The project was initiated for two reasons; the rise of the Japanese yen and the
preference of the Japanese shipowners to their national crews. In details, in mid 80s the
Japanese yen rose greatly against the major currencies and as a result, the cost of the
Japanese crew became extremely high. However, the Japanese shipowners were not
willing to flag out their vessels and use cheaper foreign crews, because of their
preference to their national crews.
Hence, under the pressure of the high operating cost and the preference for national
crews the Committee on the Modernisation of the Manning System (COMMOS) was
borne. The aim of the committee was to find an answer to the high cost of the Japanese
crews. The regulatory bodies of that effort were the Ministry of Transport and the
Japanese classification society, Nippon Kaiki Kyokai (NKK).
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The Committee’s answer to the problem was the “modernised vessels” project which
could only be applied to newly built vessels. The concept of the project was the gradual
reduction of the manning level. It was projected initially that the project would have
three stages. In the first stage the number of crew would be decreased from 22 to 18, the
second stage to 16 and finally in the third stage to 14.
However, due to the increasing cost of manning and the need for further reduction,
another stage was added in late 1988. In this stage the manning level would be
decreased to 11 crewmembers. The vessels that participated in this stage were called
“Pioneer Vessels” and were the highest-grade modernised vessels operated by 6 officers
and 5 ratings. Some typical crew costs for an all Japanese crewed vessel with reduced
manning levels were as follows:
Complement Annual Cost
18 US$2,08 million
16 US$1,84 million
14 US$1,74 million
11 US$1,27 million
Source: The Motor Ship, 1989.
In the first three stages tanker vessels had also participated in the project. In the last
stage, however, not even one tanker had participated in the project. By making this
observation the author had requested to learn by the Deputy Manager of the Japanese
Shipowners Association (JSA) whether there was any specific rationale behind the
absence of tankers from the participation in the “Pioneer Vessel” stage. His reply is
quoted and it is as follows: “…Pioneer tanker ship has never came up in Japan. There
is no legal restriction to make Pioneer tanker ship, but it is required that the high level
cargo operation for tanker and also there is the possibility of serious disasters such as
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an oil pollution in case of accidents. I guess that the ‘SAFETY FIRST’ is the reason why
Pioneer tanker ship has never been made” (Nakahara, 1999a and b and The Motor
Ship, 1989).
4.3.2 Special features of “Pioneer Vessel”
REQUIREMENT FOR EQUIPMENT FOR PIONEER VESSEL, more then 5,000 GT (Ocean Going)
1. Remote control system for valves fitted in fuel oil supply lines
2. Level remote monitoring system and high level alarm system for fuel oil tank (except them in engine
room)
3. Automatic record system for operating condition of main engine
4. Satellite navigation system
5. Auto pilot system
6. Remote control system for mooring winch on fore and aft
7. Remote control system for cargo operation
8. Remote control system for ballast operation
9. Powered opening system for side port, lampway and steel hatch cover
10. Satellite communication system
11. Centralised monitoring system for machinery on bridge
12. ARPA
13. Cargo hose handling system
14. Powered winch for emergency towing rope
15. Centralised monitoring system for reefer container
16. Centralised control system for machinery on the bridge
17. Power winch for pilot ladder
18. Fixed wash deck system (for bulkers)
19. Remote control system for main engine and steering on both bridge wing
Table 24. Source: Nakahara, 1999a.
Except the technical requirements described with details in table 24, another special
feature of “Pioneer Vessels” is the introduction of the dual-purpose crew. The crew
employed in those vessels has extended education in order to undertake alternative
roles. The officers have been trained and certified to stand not only as deck but also as
engine officers. The same has been applied for ratings and they can perform duties as
deck and as engine crew.
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Moreover, the “Pioneer Vessels” are routed around the world and in order to make these
vessels more attractive to the crews, a special supporting system has been introduced.
This system is described by the Deputy Manager of the JSA as follows: “…When the
vessel calls Japanese ports, the suitable number of alternative crew (for supporting)
should be dispatched for giving rest to original crew. If the vessel does not call any
Japanese ports more than 7 months, additional crew should be served on board her
within 7 months. This supporting system is stated in the collecting bargaining
agreement with union. The cost of the supporting system is not calculated as part of the
crewing cost” (Nakahara, 1999a and b and the Motor Ship, 1989).
4.3.3 Appraisal of the Project
Even during the implementation of the stage three of the project, the shipowners were
complaining for the slow process of implementation of the project. Their main concern
was that the rate of increase in the cost could not balance the savings from the reduction
in the crew level. Aside from the slow process of implementation, another obstacle was
raised during the implementation of the stage four, the introduction of the mixed crew.
As a result, the total number of “Pioneer vessels” during the 11 years of implementation
of the project was only 32 vessels and it was in the period 1992-94. Since then, the
number of participating vessels has constantly decreased and on 28th February 1999
they were only 14 vessels. However, judging the number of vessels involved, the first
stages of the project were more successful. In the stage one, the number of vessels
participated in the crew reduction were 71, while they were 114 in the stage two. In the
stage three the participating vessels were reduced to 27.
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Figure 4. Source: Japanese Shipowners’ Association, 1998.
Accordingly, the question arising is about the future of the project. Therefore, the author
set this question to the JSA and they replied through their Deputy Manager as follows:
“…However, firstly I say from the point of view of the international competitiveness of
merchant fleet, Japanese Pioneer Vessel is no longer competitive in comparison with
the Flag of Convenience vessel. -Quantification of this argument is given in the graph 4-
…Due to have international competitiveness of merchant fleet, we are now going to
enforce the regulations regarding “International Ships” with new mixed manning
system on 20th May 1999. …The concept of this new system is not reducing the manning
levels by means of automation and modernisation of equipment, but the mixed manning
together with foreign seafarers employed with low wages. That is to say, in Japan, we
are in the process of losing interest in the Pioneer Ship”.
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4.4 Concluding the chapter
This chapter had as an objective to present various projects that have been undertaken
around the world from major maritime nations, in order to reduce the manning cost and
ultimately to stop the fly of vessels from their national registries. The following chapter
aims to investigate an alternative solution for the Greek fleet by analysing the costs and
benefits, if any, with the implementation of the proposed solution. It is noteworthy that
the proposal is based on the fact that the Greek shipowners are chiefly purchasing
vessels from the second hand market as well as on the fact that it can be implemented
immediately.
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CHAPTER 5
The pre-study of the proposed solution
Chapter 4 presents a selection of projects, which have been undertaken by three major
maritime nations. As it was explicitly presented, these projects had two main concerns;
the reduction of the daily operating cost and the employment of national seafarers on
board these vessels. Since the loss of the competitiveness of the Greek-flagged vessels
has not yet come to a solution, this chapter aims to address the possible pros and cons of
implementing a similar project on a Greek-flagged vessel.
As a matter of fact, the whole research is a pre-study required before such a project is
fully launched, implemented and communicated to the pertinent parties. The
investigation is limited to a pre-study because of limited available time to conclude the
study and because such a project requires a big manpower team. In this specific case the
team is consisted of only one person.
Consequently, the chapter will introduce to the reader the regulatory framework of such
a project, the activities that shall be further considered and analysed, the automation that
at this stage is considered to be applied and finally a primary cost/benefit analysis will
be cited. The latter may serve as signal for a further and full implementation of the
project.
5.1 Objectives of the project
The objective of the proposed project/solution is to reduce the manning compliment on
board a Greek-flagged vessel and concurrently to introduce a higher level of automation,
if so is required. The desirable result is a reduction of the daily manning cost and
ultimately the daily operating cost of the vessel. It is desirable because conceptually, by
reducing the manning compliment, the manning cost will be reduced. However, the cost
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of the required modifications and the activities that shall be performed require time and
money. Therefore, the concept is tested on a real vessel. The level of reduction in
manning size is set, the required modification is calculated in terms of cost and finally
the costs and benefits are measured.
As a matter of fact, the pre-study is based on the objective to man a panamax tanker with
10 crewmembers. She is currently manned with 21 crewmembers.
Presentation of the vessel
Since the operator has requested not to disclose the name of the vessel, not any single
detail of the vessel will be presented. The following basic information were chosen to be
disclosed:
• Vessel type: Product tanker,
• Date delivered: 1995,
• Length Overall: 242 m/Extreme breadth: 32,2 m/Deadweight: 68,000 tonnes,
• Segregated ballast tanks; double bottom and double sides,
• Two stroke, slow speed main engine with single propeller,
• And it is traded around the world.
Full information about the vessel has been provided to the companies that have
contributed in the modification of the vessel as well as to the experts that were consulted
for the application of all the features. A great advantage for the discussions related to the
feature that will be applied has been the experience of the author on sister vessels.
The idea behind the 10-man concept is that this number is initially considered to be
satisfactory to run the vessel efficiently and effectively, having had:
• 3 Navigators, excluding Master,
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• 2 Engineers for handling repairs,
• 3 GP/AB for essential deck and engine maintenance as well as for bridge
watch keeping in the period of darkness,
• Master free of watch duty, but responsible for the administration of the
vessel,
• 3 crewmembers at each end of the vessel during mooring and unmooring,
• Sufficient manning level for manual fire fighting of the vessel, at first
glance.
As a result, the initially proposed manning compliment is as follows:
Rank
Master 1
Chief Officer 1
2nd Officer 2
Chief Engineer 1
2nd Engineer 1
AB/GP 3
Cook/Steward 1
Total 10
In addition, it has been proved that the concepts of 12, 11 and 6-man as a manning
compliment can safely, efficiently and effectively operate even bigger sized vessels. The
main idea was the establishment of a manning level close to the requirements for a
Greek compliment for this size of vessel. Such a vessel requires, according to the rules, a
manning compliment of 14, where 9 crewmembers shall be of Greek nationality.
According to Greek requirements the crew compliment will be reduced by 4
crewmembers, since the vessel is permitted to run with 14 crewmembers. However, the
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vessel is currently manned with 21 persons, so the actual reduction accounts for 11
crewmembers.
5.2 Regulatory framework of the proposed project
The following part of this chapter will cite the regulatory framework of the project. The
regulatory framework presents explicitly the postulates and the international principles
that shall be borne in mind by companies intending to be involved in such a project. It
was served as well, as an instrument for the author to analyse the project, resulting thus
in proposing some changes and pointing out the areas that would be further considered if
the project goes from theory to practice.
The regulatory framework additionally cites the procedures that the company intending
to be involved shall go through before the issue of the Safe Manning Certificate. Finally,
it is concluded by briefly describing the actual approach of this kind of project, the
sociotechnical approach.
5.2.1 Crew size; evolution and changes since the early 60s
The concept of reduced manning level through automation can be traced to the 60s.
Undoubtedly, the pioneers of the concept were the west European nations. Since the
introduction of the concept the manning level has been reduced significantly, however
the reduction can be considered as a steady and slow process.
During this period, some of the projects introduced radical reductions in manning level
and generally speaking, they are considered as the pilot projects of the consequent
reductions noticed since their launch. It was the shipping recession of 70s the motivator
for the shipowners/operators to take advantage of the technological changes in order to
make their vessels more efficient and chiefly cost effective in the face of the next serious
shipping recession (National Research Council, 1990).
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The first momentous project found in the shipping literature, was the 16-man concept.
The project was launched in 1978 by the Swedish Trans Ship Management. Ten years
later the Japanese introduced the 11-man concept with their Pioneer vessels. Soon after,
early 90s, the Danish reefer operator Lauritzen introduced the lowest manning ever, the
6-man concept (The Motor Ship, 1989 and The Motor Ship, 1990 and Transatlantic
Shipmanagement, 1989a).
In the meantime, countries like Germany, Holland and France introduced the dual
purpose certification for officers and ratings. Dual purpose certification was served as an
alternative and/or a complement to the automation concept of reducing manning
compliment on board ships.
The United States of America (USA) has not been comparatively alert in adopting
innovative schemes in this respect. The Americans dealt with similar projects in the
early 80s. Additionally, in an effort to further the cause in this field dual certification
was introduced at the U.S Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point. However, shortly
after, the dual certification was discarded because it attracted fewer and fewer enrolees
(National Research Council, 1990).
Albeit not a new trend in shipping, no specific rules have been established that shall be
complied by shipowners/operators in order to attract reduction in the manning levels.
Regulation 13, Chapter V, SOLAS 1974 requires the contracting Governments to adopt
measures to assure that the vessels flying the flag of the State are sufficiently and
efficiently manned.
Hence, each flag State must develop rules applicable to a specific case and to verify that
the safety is not compromised in the favour of saving operating costs. This fact,
79
however, is not considered by the industry as a drawback, because internationally
dictated rules may impose inappropriate standards on some ship operators and could
hinder innovation for some others.
It is pertinent to note that reductions in the manning level were the subsequent result of a
considerable study, review and experimentation by governments, operating companies
and labour organisations. The proof of this statement is that, although during the last 40
years the crew size has been substantially reduced, yet there is a measurable and
substantial reduction in vessel accidents, and this trend is consistent world-wide.
(National Research Council, 1990).
The period of reductions in manning level coincides with the break down of the
departmental distinction on board ships. The manning reductions during the 60s can be
attributed to the introduction of more sophisticated deck machinery and to the
introduction of the bridge engine control. The modernisation of vessels’ equipment and
the subsequent reduction in manning resulted in the re-allocation of the duties and
responsibilities between the deck and engine officers.
Before the introduction of any innovative automation, officers and the ratings of each
department were responsible for the operation, administration, maintenance and repairs
of their department respectively. The introduction of the engine bridge control brought
about a shift in the traditional departmental distinction. Deck officers undertook part of
the operational responsibilities from the engine officers, whereas the more sophisticated
deck machinery resulted in the participation of engine officers in the repairs and
maintenance of the deck machinery. This was the beginning of the break down of the
departmental distinction on board the vessels.
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Later on, with the introduction of dual qualified officers and/or the centralised bridge
control, further skewed departmental distinction was noticed. Deck officers became
responsible not only for the operation of the main engine but also partly for its
administration. Simultaneously, engine officers became totally responsible for the deck
repairs and partly for the maintenance of the deck machinery. At the same time the
ratings on board were trained to have appropriate skills, so as to offer their services not
only in the engine but also on the deck department. Therefore, one can say that
nowadays the departmental distinction in the technologically advanced vessels is highly
skewed and the trend is towards ship management officers instead deck and engine
officers (Munk and Pavar).
 5.2.2 Postulates for Safe Manning
Having briefly discussed the evolution of the concept, a reasonable question may arise.
The question of how an operator may achieve lower manning level than the currently
required by the flag-State. As a matter of fact, the reductions in the manning level are
based chiefly on studies and experimentation by operating companies and appropriate
regulatory bodies. The final outcome of such an experiment shall result in a vessel with
reduced manning compliment and safety equal to the safety of a fully manned vessel.
Before presenting the international principles which are dictated by the international
instruments, i.e. SOLAS 1974, the postulates that shall be borne in mind will be cited
primary. Lots of similarities have been found in the postulates, which are dictating such
projects, in nations where such projects have been developed. Chapter 23 of United
States Coast Guard Rules describes comprehensively the general features that shall be
addressed in reduced manning proposals under the title “Manning requirements for
automated vessels”. The most important features have been quoted and are as follows:
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a. Fire Equipment: Installed fire protection equipment shall be adequate for the reduced
complement to deal effectively with a fire emergency
b. Station Bill: The station Bill shall provide for the effective use of the personnel
during emergency situations
c. Lifesaving equipment: The design and installation of life saving equipment shall be
adequate for the effective operation by the complement
d. Vital Systems: Redundancy of vital systems or machinery shall be required
e. Operational limit: Scenarios of the vessel’s contemplated operation shall be provided
f. Accommodations: Quarters shall be sufficient to accommodate the designated
complement and any additional personnel needed during initial operation or during
periods when additional manning is required, such as the result of an automation
failure.
g. Messing: Coffee service, drinking water and sanitary facilities in the immediate
bridge area are necessary for the functioning of the bridge watch without the relief
service traditionally provided by an ordinary seaman.
h. Call system from the bridge: This system, running to each mate and AB’s quarters,
general spaces, such as the mess room and recreation areas, and line handling
stations, enable the summoning of crewmembers for the oncoming watch and in
emergencies, and allow better co-ordination in the mooring/unmooring of the vessel.
i. Constant tension mooring winches: These devices enable the reduced deck force to
moor/unmoor the vessel safely, without unreasonable physical effort.
j. Engine department: Automation of the engine department is the most common
method of reducing manning levels. A review of automated vessel experiences show
varying degrees of reliability in engineering automation. Accordingly, manning
reductions in the engine department shall be made only after a system has been
operated for a sufficient period of time to demonstrate its reliability (United States
Coast Guard, 1999).
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Moreover, the most common approach in considering reduction in manning level
projects is the man-machine trade off analysis. This method was followed in the
Swedish 12-man concept, the Pioneer vessels and the crew reductions in US flagged
ships in the beginning of 80’s, among others (National Research Council, 1990 and
Wikstrom, 1999 and Motor Ship, 1989).
The man-machine trade off analysis aims to identify the tasks which previously were
performed by crewmembers and which can be substituted after the modification by
automation. In addition, it aims to identify the features which shall be applied in order to
reduce the labour requirements to perform certain activities on board. The appendix 1
gives a sample of  tasks that shall be evaluated in the man-machinery trade off analysis.
Detailed job descriptions for each crewmember is also required. The job description of
each crewmember includes, in addition, the newly undertaken responsibilities
(Wikstrom, 1999).
Ultimately, the shipowner/operator has to decide and allocate the responsibility of the
management of the vessel. Since minimal manning projects have been undertaken, two
main models have been followed, either transferring of the management of the vessel to
the shore or transferring of the management to the ship.
In the first case, the crew is only responsible for the safe operation of the vessel between
the port A and port B. Maintenance is carried out from “riding gangs” and all the
arrangements are made from the company according to the maintenance plan set up.
In the second case, the company sets at the beginning of each year the budget of the ship
and then the budget is accomplished by the crew. For the planning and the carrying out
of the maintenance, the onboard manning compliment is fully liable, taking into
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consideration the budget set by the headquarters. (National Research Council, 1990 and
Wikstrom, 1999 and Carl, 1994).
To sum up, the shipowner/operator, before addressing the international principles which
are dictated by the international mandatory instruments, shall consider the general
features required by the flag-State. The following step is the man-machine trade off
analysis where labour savings features will be applied. Finally, the allocation of the
ship’s management shall be considered. Hence, having clearly defined with the use of
postulates the new model, the working team, with the application of the international
principles, can identify the constraints of the model and apply the necessary
improvements or modifications.
5.2.3 Principles of Safe Manning
Since the postulates facilitate the establishment of the new manning model, the
consequent step is the identification of the constraints of the proposed model. Therefore,
after establishing the new manning level the shipowner/operator shall additionally
consider the requirements of the principles of safe manning, which are the followings:
a. STCW ’95, Section A-VIII/2  part 3-1 paragraph 15 states that the officer in charge
of the navigational watch may be the sole look-out in daylight provided that on each
such an occasion:
• The situation has been carefully assessed and it has been established without
doubt that it is safe to do so,
• Full account has been taken of all relevant factors, including but not limited, to:
- state of the weather,
- visibility,
- traffic density,
- proximity of dangers to navigation,
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- the necessary attention when navigating in or near traffic separation schemes,
and
- assistance immediately available to be summoned to the bridge when any
change in the situation so requires.
b. The Maritime Safety Committee in its sixty fifth session, January 1996, decided to
discontinue the trials with the officer of the navigational watch acting as the sole
look-out in periods of darkness (MSC 66/7/1, 1st March 1996).
c. Regulation 13, Chapter V, SOLAS 1974 states, among others, that the Contracting
Governments undertake, each for its national ships, to maintain, or, if it is necessary,
to adopt, measures for the purpose of ensuring that, from the point of view of safety
of life at sea, all ships shall be sufficiently and efficiently manned.
d.  Resolution A.481 (XII), which is referred to the Principles of safe manning adopted
by the IMO.
e. Rule 5, part B, Section 1, COLREG states that every vessel shall at all times
maintain proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means,
appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions, so as to make a full
appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.
f. Chapter II-2, SOLAS; Fire protection, fire detection and fire extinction & Chapter
III, SOLAS; Life saving appliances and arrangements. Although not stated, it is
indirectly implied that sufficient manning is required to permit manual fire fighting
as well as to efficiently maintain the life saving appliances and to execute routine
inspections and drills. The same is clearly mentioned in the Principles of safe
manning, resolution A.481(XII).
g. In cases where either Integrated Navigation System (INS) or Integrated Bridge
System (IBS) may be selected as bridge instrumentation and layout, the following
mandatory instruments shall be applied:
-Recommendations on performance standards for an INS; Resolution MSC.86(70)
(IMO, 1998)
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-Recommendations on performance standards for an IBS; Resolution A.694(17)
provides the general requirements while the recommendations describes the
performance standards (IMO, 1996)
In addition, a working group on Comprehensive review of resolution A.481(XII), which
was instructed by the Sub-Committee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping
(STW) in its 29th session,  prepared a draft Assembly resolution for consideration and
approval at the seventy-first session of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). On
January 27th 1999 the working group came up with a draft proposal for reviewing the
Assembly resolution, which accordingly has forwarded for approval in the 71st MSC
session. After consideration and approval in 71st MSC session, the draft will be
forwarded for adoption in the 21st Assembly.
During the 30th session of the Sub-Committee on STW, when the issue of the revised
Assembly resolution A.481(XII) was discussed for the adoption of the draft, some
delegations supported the idea that a standard model shall be created. However, it was
agreed that it was premature to consider further work on this issue until experience had
been gained in the use of the principles of safe manning in the revised solution.
Finally, in establishing crew compliment the following international mandatory
instruments shall be considered, regarding watch keeping and prevention of fatigue on
establishing safe manning level:
a. STCW Code Section A Chapter VIII; Standards regarding watch keeping
(navigational and engineering watch),
b. STCW Code Section A Chapter VIII/1; Fitness for duty. It describes the work hour
limits,
c. STCW Code Section B Chapter VIII/1; Guidance regarding fitness for duty. It is
related to the prevention of fatigue.
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5.2.4 Procedures for the Safe Manning Certification
Except the rules required by the national and international regulatory bodies, there are
procedures that the maritime nations follow when the shipowner/operator applies for
reduction in manning level. These procedures are not supported directly by international
rules and regulations. However, the principles of safe manning dictate their existence
indirectly. In countries where such projects have been carried out, the following
procedures are required before the issue of safe manning certification:
a. Conceptual approval: Before any modification may take place, the owner/operator
shall request for the national maritime administration to evaluate his proposed
modification and crew size. At this stage the national maritime administration
(MARAD) evaluates only whether the proposed manning scheme is sufficient for the
safe operation of the vessel.
b. Trial period: The trial period is the period where the proposed schemes and
introduced automations are examined in order that the viability of the minimal
crewing as well as the reliability of automations is verified.
c. Observation trip: Once the vessel is in operation a MARAD inspector shall sail with
the vessel for a sufficient period to assess the reliability of the system. It is also
recommended to the inspectors prior to their embarkation to have studied the engine
logs, maintenance records and overtime logs in order not only to prepare an
inspection plan but also to identify areas where special attention shall be taken.
Having conducted his inspection, the inspector shall submit a detailed report where
he evaluates the scheme. Finally, this inspection shall be performed periodically,
aiming to ascertain the performance of the scheme. In the appendix 2 an observation
trip report is attached. The report was written for the Atlantic Container Lines’
(ACL) 12-man concept ship (United States Coast Guard, 1999 and Transatlantic
Ship Management, 1989a, Wikstrom, 1999 and National Research Council, 1990).
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5.2.5 ISM Code and crew reduction projects
On July 1st 1998 the ISM Code came in force for passenger ships, tankers, gas carriers,
bulk carriers and mobile offshore units. The code is not related to minimal crewing,
however the author feels that companies which have implemented the code, have an
advantage to undertake minimal crewing schemes.
Explicitly, the code requires the company to develop plans for shipboard operations,
emergency preparedness, maintenance of the ship and equipment and finally plans to
control all documents and data which are relevant to a Safety Management System
(SMS). That is to say, the companies have a description of each task performed on
board, the number of people required to perform each task, the number of people
required for each emergency situation, among others.
Having had all these descriptions, the evaluator can assess the number of people actually
required to perform each task. Therefore, he can identify the areas of duplication and re-
assess the number of people actually required for the proper performance of each task.
Then, the next step of the evaluator is a man-machine trade off analysis, where he can
further reduce the crew size by substituting crewmembers with appropriate automation.
The whole task of re-assessment through the use of the implemented ISM can give them
the answer to the actual crew size required to perform the safe operation of their vessels.
The idea was discussed with a considerable number of people from the industry. The
validity of the idea has been accepted by the majority of them. The only drawback is the
fact that the implementation of the Code has its first anniversary in a few days.
Consequently, the drawbacks of the implementation have not yet been measured and
actually it will take a decade for the appropriate beneficial analysis of the Code.
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5.2.6 The human element
A company intending to undertake a minimal crewing project shall also consider how to
manage the human element in the overall scenario. Smaller crew size may give rise to
problems such as fatigue and boredom, shipboard living conditions and also alcohol and
drug abuse.
Getting started from the fatigue and boredom, it is a fact that the crew reduction can
raise questions about the workload. One can overcome this argument by re-organising
and re-assigning the workload structure and the duties of the crewmwmbers. The
ultimate aim of this effort is to maintain safety at the standards comparable to a full crew
compliment.
Another problem that shall be overcome is the shipboard living conditions for a small
sized crew. Low manning level gives rise to problems such as social interaction among
crewmembers. This can be tackled by enhancing living conditions through careful
ergonomic attention to the design of living areas. On the other hand, a smaller crew size
by itself results in the breakdown of the departmental distinctions. A factor that
significantly will enhance the social aspects of shipboard living.
Last but not least, there is the problem of the drug and alcohol abuse. Drug and alcohol
abuse can severely affect the safety of operations. Therefore, the whole project requires
careful management of the alcohol availability and close monitoring of the physical and
emotional health of crew members (National Research Council, 1990 and Monk,
1991and The Motor Ship, 1989).
5.2.7 A sociotechnical approach
The applicable rules as well as the procedures required for the implementation of a
reduction project were discussed. The required measures that shall be considered to
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manage the human element were also discussed. Hence, one can clearly see that the
whole project is a sociotechnical system built up by:
a. the technologies that will be applied,
b. the crewmembers,
c. the required organisational structure and
d. the external environment, safety in this case, which may be affected from the
implementation of the project.
It is also clear that all these factors are interdependent. As a result, a change in one of the
elements results and/or necessitates changes in other elements. Therefore, with the
appropriate actions, which are
a. introduction of new technology,
b. appropriate training of the crewmembers,
c. refining organisational structure on board and
d. ergonomic design of spaces and applicable technology
safety, the external environment, will not be degraded. Because of this fundamental
interdependence, the introduction of technological change can not be viewed in
isolation, but it must be viewed from a true system perspective (National Research
Council, 1990).
5.3 Proposed modifications
5.3.1 Engine department
The project has as an objective for the engine department to man it with two engineer
officers; one Chief Engineer and one Second Engineer. Moreover, assistance to them
will be provided by the 3 GP/ABs. With such a small manning compliment for this
department, the engineers shall only be occupied in planning maintenance, which shall
be very limited, and to handle the unscheduled repairs. Therefore, there is a need to
transfer the daily operation and administration of the M/E to the navigators and
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concurrently increase the reliability and the maintainability of the M/E and the auxiliary
equipment.
MAN B&W, the manufacturer of the engine, is considered to be the most appropriate
company for assuring the reliability and maintainability of the M/E. Therefore, a line of
communication was established with them, aiming to upgrade the M/E and ultimately its
reliability. The final outcome of this research was poor, because the engine model was
considered rather new and they did not have upgrading packages (Thostrup, 1999).
The other consideration was the transferring of the daily administration and operation of
the M/E and auxiliary equipment from the engineers to the navigators. In order to
achieve this objective, the level of existing automation was considered and an
automation specialist was consulted. The selected vessel for this study is certified for
unmanned machinery operation (UMS), which means that the level of automation is
high.
Lynsgoe Marine a/s having considered the objectives and the available automation of the
vessel, reverted with the following proposal(Wind-Jensen, 1999):
A. Universal Control System/Universal Monitoring System UCS/UMS 2100
It is a fully integrated system allowing the monitoring and handling of all the alarms. It
consists of the following elements (Figure 5):
a. Outstations: They are independent units, collecting and processing data
retrieved from the process they are monitoring,
b. Graphic Operator Stations (GOS): It displays information from several
systems and units simultaneously,
c. Operator panels: They are divided in two kinds; Basic Alarm Panels (BAP)
and Accommodation Alarm Panel (AAP). These panels provide the duty
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Figure 5. UMS/UCS 2100, System lay-out Drawing.
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officer with instant information in clear readable text. The operator can
communicate with the system to obtain more information.
d. Printers: Printers can print out alarm and data logs as well as generate
manoeuvre logs.
The system will have an effect on the following areas:
a. Propulsion Control:
• Main engine start/stop system,
• Diesel engine safety system,
• Exhaust gas temperature deviation alarms,
• Bearing temperature deviation alarm,
• Propulsion mode selection with engine mode and clutch display,
b. Generating plant:
• Power management system,
• Auxiliary engine start/stop system,
• Auxiliary engine monitoring system,
• Exhaust gas temperature deviation alarms,
c. Damage Control:
• Control of fire fighting system with fire alarm indication,
• Fire damper control.
d. Ancillary systems:
• Ventilation system,
• S.W cooling system,
• F.W cooling system,
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• Lub-oil system,
• Compressed air system.
e. Auxiliary systems:
• F.O transfer and services system,
• Fuel consumption calculations,
• Bilge control,
• Ballast control,
• Air conditioning system.
f. Tanks:
• Remote tank level gauging
• Tank contents calculations
• Tank level alarms
• Interface to loading calculator
In addition to the above, the system will have the following features as well:
a. Dead man alarm; Engine room: if the alarm is not acknowledged in the predefined
time, an alarm is released on the bridge, in all duty engineers’ cabins and in public
rooms.
b. Calling system for engineers: from any alarm panel of the system, the engineers can
be called individually or generally.
c. Bridge alarm system: in cases where a bridge alarm is not acknowledged from the
officer on watch (OOW) or when the OOW does not reset the “fitness check” alarm,
which shall be acknowledged in pre-defined time intervals, an alarm is raised in
captain’s cabin and in the selected back up navigator.
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B. Diesel Manoeuvring System DMS 2100
This system offers a fully automatic remote control of the main engine from the bridge
and the engine control room (ECR). The access to the data is ensured by the intelligent
operator panels. The proposed system offers the following features:
• Fully automatic control from the bridge and the ECR,
• Change-over from automatic to manual control from the ECR,
• Step-less speed control,
• RPM limitation from the ECR,
• Fine adjustment of set point, digital display of RPM and set point on the
bridge and in the ECR,
• Redudant speed sensing and indication.
In addition, the engine protection is assured by:
• Automatic load program,
• Automatic avoidance of critical speed range,
• Slow down functions,
• Start blockings.
The basic elements of the system are shown in the Figure 6.
C. Diesel Protection System DPS 2100
This system protects the engine against critical parameters such as over speed, low
lubrication oil pressure and high cooling water temperature. It is independent of the
main engine remote control for automatic and manual shut down as well as for
emergency shut down or automatic power reduction to protect the propulsion system
against damaging operating conditions. Intelligent operator panels enable simple access
to all data.
The features of the system are as follows:
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• Fully automatic handling of slow downs and shut downs,
• Protection against over speed,
• Supervision of inputs against cable break,
• Redudant speed sensing and indication.
The Figure 6 also shows the basic elements of the system.
D. Electronic Governor System EGS 2000
The EGS controls the speed of the rotation of the output shaft according to a given
speed-setting input. By doing this, it ensures the best running conditions in any given
situation. This provides maximum engine efficiency and optimum fuel consumption. At
the same time, it minimizes wear and tear on the fuel rack and the risk of the thermal
overloading of the engine. The basic elements of the system are exhibited in the Figure 6
as well.
5.3.1.1 Cost of ship’s automation
The total cost of automations excluding cost of retrofitting was DKK 2,700,000
(374,521$, 1USD=7,2092 DKK - 04/06/99). The cost of retrofitting could not be
calculated without surveying the vessel, however the worst case which was 80% of the
cost of automations was calculated. That is to say, the cost of retrofitting was 299,617$.
The total cost for the introduction of the automations was 674,139$.
5.3.1.2 Evaluation of the automation
A review of automated vessels experiences show varying degrees of reliability in
engineering automation. Accordingly, manning reductions in the engine department
shall be made only after a system has been operated for sufficient period of time to
demonstrate its reliability. Therefore, the results of the proposed system can only be
evaluated in the trial period of the concept.
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In addition, since man-machinery trade off analysis can not answer the question of
reliability and maintainability of the M/E and auxiliary equipment, the current
maintenance plan shall be re-viewed. Re-visiting and re-scheduling the maintenance
plans can give an answer not only to the required reliability but also to the need and
frequency of riding gangs to assist the engine compliment.
5.3.2 Deck department
Another objective of the project is to reduce the ratings to only 3 AB/GP. Therefore,
there is a need to reduce as much as possible the maintenance required on the deck
department, because their new duties will be limited to:
• Watch keeping in the period of darkness,
• Preparation of the vessel for the next port of call,
• Essential maintenance for both departments,
• Assistance to engineer officers for engine repairs.
Considering these facts, it was decided to introduce a new paint system for the vessel.
The introduction of a new paint system aims to minimize the work hours required for the
maintenance of the steel construction and the cosmetic appearance of the vessel. In co-
operation with a paint manufacturer, it was decided that the vessel shall be blast cleaned
initially and accordingly repainted with long lasting paints. The whole proposed plan is
as follows:
A. Blast cleaning
The areas that will be sand blasted are the following:
• Underwater parts: approximately 15,000 m2,
• Topsides: approximately 2,000 m2,
• Main deck: approximately 9,000 m2,
• Accommodation: approximately 1,800 m2.
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Table 25a. Jotun’s proposal
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Table 25b. Jotun’s proposal
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An approximate cost is 220,000$ (prices of June 1999), and it can vary significantly
since it is dependent upon the following factors:
• The shipyard that will undertake to perform the task,
• The condition of the vessel’s plates.
However, the 220,000$ is considered the worst case.
B. Vessel’s coating
Accordingly, the paint system called JOTAMASTIC 87 ALLUMINIUM produced by
JOTUN will be applied on the vessel. The product description is as follows (Andersson,
1999):
Jotamastic 87 Alluminium is a two-pack surface tolerant, high solids epoxy-based
coating, for use in cases where optimum pretreatment is not feasible. It may be applied
in high film thickness. This product is part of a complete system which is certified not to
spread surface flames.
Moreover, some technical information about the product:
• Gloss retention: fair,
• Water resistance: excellent,
• Chemical resistance: good,
• Solvent resistance: good,
• Abrasion resistance: very good.
Furthermore, the properties of the selected system are:
• Penetration: Jotamastic 87 penetrates and adheres to blast cleaned steel and
seals the surface,
• Adhesion: Superior adhesion is a key feature of the Jotamastic 87 preventing
flaking and delamination and reducing undercutting if damage occurs,
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• Durability: the surface tolerance, excellent penetration and superior adhesion
properties of Jotamastic 87 provide exceptional mechanical strength. These
benefits combined with high film thickness, provide excellent resistance to
abrasion, mechanical damage, stress and exposure to the elements.
Although blast cleaning is not required, it was decided that sand blasting will improve
the performance of the system. In co-operation with Jotun the following program was
decided to be applied on the vessel:
In all areas, one coat of Jotamastic 87 will be applied on bare spots after spot blasting.
At that time, the whole surface will be covered by a coat of Jotamastic 87 Alluminium
RT. Accordingly, each area will have the following treatment:
• Topsides: For an enhanced cosmetic appearance Jotamastic 87 can be over-
coated with Penguard top coat.
• Underwater area; The Jotamastic 87 Alluminium RT will be followed by two
coats of anti fouling. Hence, the building up of thick film is avoided. A thick
film results in the crack and flaking of the anti fouling,
• Main deck: For enhanced cosmetic appearance and due to the fact that main
deck is subjected to the most severe operating conditions, the Jotamastic 87
Alluminium RT was decided to be covered by an Penguard epoxy topcoat.
• Accommodation: The final coat over the Jotamastic 87 Alluminium RT will
be a Penguard epoxy topcoat.
The full description of the applied system is given in the tables 25a and 25b. The tables
25a and b describe in details the theoritical spreading rate (Theo. Spr. Rate), the practical
speading rate (Pract. Spr. Rate), the application of area in percentage, the dry film
thickness (DFT), the wet film thickness (WFT), the theoritical and practical
consumption and finally the total quantity of paint required to be applied in each area.
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The total cost of the paint system is as follows:
Topsides:                  992 lt,
Underwater parts: 12,306 lt,
Main deck:             3,931 lt,
Accommodation:      745 lt
  Total:                   17,974 lt  x 10,75$ per/lt = 193,220$.
5.4 Other areas of consideration
The introduction of the automation and the new paint system are neither a guarantee that
the vessel can be manned with only 10 crewmembers nor the solution to the problems of
reduced manning level. They are only some tools to reduce work hours required for the
performance of some activities, which are time consuming, permitting thus the shifting
of the workload in other activities.
Therefore, man-machine trade off analysis shall be further investigated. However,
merely substituting tasks performed by the crewmembers is not the solution to all the
problems. An extensive man-machine trade off analysis may result in zero manning, but
this is not the point. One shall consider as well the constraints imposed by situations
such as:
• Peak work load conditions,
• Mooring and unmooring related to the requirements at calling ports,
• Manual fire fighting,
• Frequency of port call in relation to rest hours, maintenance and duties that are
required,
in addition to the international and national regulations related to the subject, i.e. the
permitting working hours for each crew member. Considering all these parameters, the
viability of the 10-man concept or the need for higher manning level will be revealed.
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Finally, an important instrument is the job description for each crewmember. Job
description provides in details the newly assigned tasks and responsibilities. Newly
undertaken tasks reveal the needs for training and newly undertaken responsibilities.
5.5 Comparing levels of automation
REQUIREMENT FOR EQUIPMENT FOR PIONEER VESSEL, more then 5,000
GT (Ocean Going)
Available in
the vessel in
question
1. Remote control system for valves fitted in fuel oil supply lines • 
2. Level remote monitoring system and high level alarm system for fuel oil tank
(except them in engine room)
• 
3. Automatic record system for operating condition of main engine • 
4. Satellite navigation system • 
5. Auto pilot system • 
6. Remote control system for mooring winch on fore and aft • 
7. Remote control system for cargo operation • 
8. Remote control system for ballast operation • 
9. Powered opening system for side port, lampway and steel hatch cover Not applicable
10. Satellite communication system • 
11. Centralised monitoring system for machinery on bridge • 
12. ARPA • 
13. Cargo hose handling system • 
14. Powered winch for emergency towing rope Not available
15. Centralised monitoring system for reefer container Not applicable
16. Centralised control system for machinery on the bridge • 
17. Power winch for pilot ladder Not available
18. Fixed wash deck system (for bulkers) Not applicable
19. Remote control system for main engine and steering on both bridge wing Only for M/E
Table 26. Comparing level of automation
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The required level of automation to efficiently and effectively run the Japanese Pioneer
vessels is cited in chapter 4. The required level of automation for the aforementioned
vessels was compared with the level of automation of the vessel in question, including
the automation that is proposed to be applied. As it is clearly viewed by the table 26, the
vessel in question has almost identical automation with the Pioneer vessels. This
comparison is cited to present to the reader that the automation existing on board and the
proposed additional one can be considered sufficient to man the vessel with lower
manning compliment. Therefore, a company intending to undertake such a project shall
focus its effort in the organisational structure of the vessel and re-organise the activities
of the manning compliment.
5.6 Total cost of the proposed modification
Before the appraisal of the project as an investment, the following subjects shall be
addressed:
• Total cost to modify the vessel,
• The incentives that will be provided to the participating officers and ratings,
• The costs which are not included in the calculation,
• The impact of the modification to the depreciation of the vessel,
• And a way to reduce the cost of the project.
The aim is to clearly present to the reader the items that will be considered in the
investment appraisal of the project.
A. Cost of modification
The proposed modifications are fully described in the 5.3 and their total cost is as
follows:
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Automation: 674,139$
Paint system: 193,220$
Blast Cleaning:220,000$
Total Cost: 1,087,359$
B. Cost of the incentives
Since the project is dependent not only upon the level of automation and the re-
establishment of the organisational structure of the vessel, but also upon the participating
officers and ratings, there is a need for incentives that shall be provided to them.
Therefore, it was decided to reduce the contract period from 6 to 4 months. Monetary
incentives were also decided to be provided. The monetary incentive will be a 10%
increase in the salaries required by the collective agreements. Both incentives are
subjected to changes with the unions of seafarers. However, the pre-establishment of
these costs will assist in the investment appraisal of the project.
C. Costs which are not included
In the pre-study it was not possible to calculate the cost of maintenance by “riding
gangs”. In addition, the cost of training the officers and the ratings in their new duties
has not been calculated. Moreover, the cost for dry-docking and the off-hire period for
the modification is not taken into account. The cost for dry-docking is not considered
because not only the prices can vary significantly from day to day and from company to
company, but also in similar projects an investment appraisal was not conducted. Similar
rationale is valid for the off-hire period as well. Another view is that the required dry-
docking and the consequent off-hire period can be performed in the 1st special survey of
the vessel and thus exclude these costs from the total cost of the modification.
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D. Depreciation
By investing on the vessel, the vessel shall be re-valued resulting in the rescheduling of
the depreciation. The rescheduling of the depreciation will not affect the net cash flows,
however it will affect the profit which will be generated by the vessel. Because of the
fact that there is no available freight forecasting beyond 2005 in order to make a full
appraisal of the effect on rescheduled depreciation, a simple method is employed to cite
its effect.
The actual purchased price of the vessel in question can not be disclosed and in order to
make the calculation, the average price of similar vessels contracted to be built in 1994
will be used, which is 40m$. In addition, the value of the vessel at the end of its
economical life is its scrap value, which, according to the present prices, is for the vessel
in discussion 1,760,000$.
Moreover, the operator of the vessel uses straight-line method of depreciation.
Therefore, he depreciates the vessel annually by 1,529m$. As a result the book value of
the vessel at the beginning of the 5th year is 33,8m$. By investing 1,1m$, the new book
value will be 34,9m$. The calculation of the rescheduled depreciation gives 1,58m$ per
annum, which means 52,000$ lower annual profit due to the investment.
E. Savings
The implementation of the project requires the formation of a team that will handle the
project. The use of external source may be costly, therefore a considerable amount of
savings can come by forming a team from the shore and sea personnel of the company.
Cross-functional responsibilities can be a source of delays for the project, however
careful formation of the working groups with the right people as well as appropriate
scheduling of activities and well balanced workload among the members of the group
can overcome the problem.
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5. 7 Investment appraisal of the project
Having already discussed the initially required modifications of the vessel, the
consequent step is the appraisal of the project as an investment. The appraisal aims to
assess the attractiveness of the project as an investment, whether this is the only criterion
for the company to be involved in the project. Nevertheless, before proceeding to the
appraisal, as a separate issue, the cost of the crewing solutions for the vessel, will be
discussed.
5.7.1 Daily crewing cost
Reduced
manning
1$=277drachma
(1998)
100% Greek Crew
(Greek flag)
Number of
crewmembers
Total payment
In $ (monthly)
Master 1 8,558
C/O 1 5,620
2/O 2 8,694
Ch. Eng. 1 8,304
2nd Eng 1 5,821
AB/Motorman 3 8,542
Ch.Cook 1 4,294
Total 10 49,833
pd (365) 1,638
Plus 10% 1,802
Travelling cost 74
New cost pd 1,876
Plus 2% 37.52
TOTAL COST pd 1,914
Table 27. Crewing cost with reduced manning.
As it was described in 5.6.B, the participating officers and ratings will be provided with
an increase in their salaries over their collective agreements accounting for 10%. In
addition, their contract length will be reduced by 6 to 4 months. Taking into account the
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cost of these incentives, the daily manning cost of the vessel, if it will be manned with
10 crewmembers, is 1,914$. Table 27 reveals in detail the calculation of the cost of the
reduced manning concept.
 In parallel, another calculation was concluded, the cost of manning under a flag of
convenience, which can be viewed in table 28. The calculation was concluded having in
mind the Greek approach of manning under a flag of convenience (FOC). It is
commonly found that on Greek–controlled vessels flying a FOC the Master and the
Chief Engineer are Greeks, while the remaining crewmembers are of mixed foreign
nationalities. In this specific case the calculation was concluded by assuming that the
rest of the crewmembers are chiefly from Philippines.
FOC 1$=277drachma (1998)
Hellenic crew
Number of
crewmembers
Total payment
In $ (monthly)
Master 1 7,893
Chief Officer 1 7,671
Filipino Crew
Deck officers 3 5,524
Engine Officers 3 5,524
Deck ratings 7 7,133
Catering ratings 4 3,856
Engine ratings 2 1,830
Other
nationality crew
Electrician 1 1,300
TOTAL 22 40,731
pd 1,339.10
Travelling cost 91.00
Plus 2% 28.60
Total cost 42,161.10
Total cost pd 1,405,37
Table 28. Daily manning cost under a FOC.
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The purpose of these calculations is to cite the differences in cost among the current
manning, the proposed manning and the manning under a FOC. The first comparison,
between the current manning cost and the 10-man concept, serves to calculate the
savings, if it will be decided to man the vessel with the 10-man concept instead of the
present manning. The total annual savings will be named later cash flows that the
investment generates.
According to the operator of the vessel, the manning cost of the vessel is currently
2.600$ per day. Therefore, the annual savings, manning-wise, will be the difference of
the current manning cost with the manning cost of the 10-man concept, multiplied by
365. That is to say, 2,600$ - 1,914$ = 686$pd x 365 = 250.390$ annual savings or cash
flows annually generating by the investment.
The second comparison aims to cite the level of improvement achieved by implementing
the project. Manning the vessel under a FOC is 46% less expensive than the manning
under the Greek flag, whereas the 10-man concept reduces this gap to 27%. Hence, the
manning cost is reduced by 26%, resulting in a lower daily operating cost of the vessel.
5.7.2 Methods of appraisal (based on Mottram, 1998 and Mott, 1989)
The investment will be appraised using two methods; a conventional method and a
discounted cash flow method. The first method consists of three calculations,
nonetheless not interrelated among each other. Each of these calculations serves a
different objective of the appraisal and they are considered as the initial filters of an
investment. The second method, the discounted cash flow, takes on account an important
element not considered in the conventional methods, the time value of money.
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5.7.2.1 Conventional methods
5.7.2.1.1 Payback time
The payback time is an appraisal based on the concept that the earlier the investment
pays back the original investment, the safer the investment is. As it was aforementioned,
the cash flows that this investment generates are the savings from the reduced manning
compliment that are accounted for 250,390$ annually.
Year Annual cash flows Cumulative cash flows
0 -1,500,000 -1,500,000
1 +250,390 -1,249,610
2 +250,390 -999,220
3 +250,390 -748,830
4 +250,390 -498,440
5 +250,390 -248,050
6 +250,390 +2,340
Table 29. Payback time calculation.
Therefore, according to the calculation, which can be seen in the above table, the cash
flows generated by the investment pays back the initial investment in less than 6 years.
Considering the fact that the remaining economical life of the vessel is 21 years, since it
is 4 years old, there is a remaining of 15 years for the investment to generate a profit as
well.
5.7.2.1.2 Rate of return (ROR)
The rate of return is another conventional method of appraising an investment. The
concept behind this conventional method of appraising an investment, is that it measures
the annual return of the investment in terms of percentage on the average value of the
investment. The average value of the investment in the entire economical life of the
project is considered to be the average investment. Accordingly,
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Average investment = (Value of the original investment - Value at the end) / 2=
                                 = (1.087.359$ - 0$) / 2 = 543,680$
Before proceeding to the calculation of the ROR, it is required, additionally, the
calculation of the average profit per annum, which is equal to the total cash inflow
generated by the investment less the total cash outflows. The remaining economical life
of the vessel is 21 years and it is expected to generate annual cash flow of 250,390$,
which is the savings from the manning reduction. Moreover, the cost of modification
accounts for 1,087,359$. Therefore,
Total cash inflow = 21years x 250,390$ = 5,258,190$
Total cash outflow = 1,087,359$
Total profit = 4,170,831$
The total profit divided by the remaining economical life of the vessel produces the
average profit per annum, which is generated by the project.
Average profit per annum = Total profit / Economical life of the project =
      = 4,170,831$ / 21 years = 198,611$
Having calculated the average profit per annum and the average value of the investment,
the final phase is the calculation of the ROR.
ROR = Average Profit pa / Average Investment = 198,611$ / 543,679$ = 37%
As a number, the result of the calculation is very attractive. However, each company has
its own economical targets when it decides to invest. It also considers factors such as
effort required to achieve the specific target and the profits generated in terms of volume
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of money. The reason of mentioning these two factors is to underline that an investment
may be attractive in terms of results extracted of the analytical tools, however if the
volume of money generated is lower than the effort required, the investment may be
rejected.
5.7.2.1.3 Return on investment (ROI)
Last but not least, a method of conventional appraisal was selected to be presented, the
return on the investment due to similarities with the ROR. ROI shows the relation of the
annual profit as a percentage of the original investment, instead of the average
investment. Therefore,
Total cash inflow = 21years x 250,390$ = 5,258,190$
Total cash outflow = 1,087,359$
Total profit = 4,170,831$
Furthermore, the total profit divided by the remaining economical life of the vessel
produces the average profit per annum, which is generated by the project.
Average profit per annum = Total profit / Economical life of the project =
      = 4,170,831$ / 21 years = 198,611$
Finally,
ROI = Average profit pa / Original investment =
        = 198,611$ / 1,087,359$ = 18%
Expressing the views of the result, it shall be said that the concluding comments on the
ROR are valid for the ROI as well.
113
5.7.2.2 Discounted cash flow method; The time cost of money
Having discussed the conventional methods of investment appraisal, it is noteworthy to
mention that the major drawback of these methods is the fact that the time value of
money is not taken into account. In order to measure the impact of this factor in this
investment, the discounted cash flow method will be employed. Using the cost of capital
as a discounted cash flow factor, the method projects the future value of cash flows as
present values. Hence, they can be compared with the original investment, so as to draw
conclusions.
The discounted cash flow is the weighted average cost of capital of the vessel’s operator
being 10%. The savings due to the reduced manning compliment will be the benefit
from the investment and they will be discounted by 10% (the cost of capital). Their sum
will be the Gross Present Value (GPV) of the investment. GPV less the original
investment will produce the Net Present Value (NPV) of the investment, which can be
used to draw conclusions. In table 30 the calculation of the NPV for this investment can
be viewed.
As it can be seen in table 30, there is a surplus in the NPV, which is the surplus that the
investment generates comparing with the value of the investment today. In this table,
another important element of investment appraisal is presented, the Internal Rate of
Return (IRR). IRR works out the DCF giving NPV=0. In this specific case, it means that
in the cases that the cost of capital is higher than 11% the NPV of the investment will
have a negative surplus and the project will most probably be characterised not worth
investing.
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Cash Outflow
Benefit from
the
investment DCF 10% PV GPV NPV IRR
1999 -1,087,359 -1,087,359 2,157,846 1,070,487 11%
1999 250,390 1,1000 227,627
2000 250,390 1,2100 206,934
2001 250,390 1,3300 188,263
2002 250,390 1,4641 171,020
2003 250,390 1,6105 155,472
2004 250,390 1,8758 133,484
2005 250,390 1,9487 128,491
2006 250,390 2,1436 116,808
2007 250,390 2,3579 106,192
2008 250,390 2,5937 96,538
2009 250,390 2,8531 87,761
2010 250,390 3,1384 79,783
2011 250,390 3,4522 72,531
2012 250,390 3,7974 65,937
2013 250,390 4,1772 59,942
2014 250,390 4,5949 54,493
2015 250,390 5,0544 49,539
2016 250,390 5,5599 45,035
2017 250,390 6,1159 40,941
2018 250,390 6,7274 37,219
2019 250,390 7,4002 33,836
Figures in USD.
Cost of Capitals 10%, which equals to the DCF.
DCF: Discounted Cash Flow, PV: Present Value, GPV: Gross Present Value,
NPV: Net Present Value, IRR: Internal Rate of Return.
Table 30. Discounted Cash Flow calculation
5.7.2.2.1 Sensitivity analysis
Since this research is a pre-study, the possibility of a change in one of the figures of the
calculation is quite high, shortly after the completion of this research. Therefore, the
analysis needs to be re-concluded by changing the basic elements of the calculation in
order to measure the sensitivity of the initial calculation.
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Graph 7. IRR and Manning cost savings
Three scenarios were considered to test the sensitivity of the analysis; lower savings
from the reduced manning, higher cost of modification and finally lower capital cost of
the investment. Graphs 7,8 and 9 reveal in detail the results.
Graph 8. IRR and Cost of modification.
In brief, little lower savings from the manning cost result in an unattractive IRR. The
same was noticed for higher cost of modification. Finally, the impact of higher cost of
capital was not measured, since the initial 11% IRR is the indication of the cost of
capital, where the NPV=0. However, the initial result was tested against lower cost of
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capital and the results were very attractive, since a 9% cost of capital results in an IRR
of 13%.
Graph 9. IRR and Cost of capital.
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5.8 Concluding the project
A SWOT analysis has been performed in order to summarise the strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats of the proposal. It serves as a concluding paragraph as well.
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• Similar projects have been
successfully implemented,
• It improves competitiveness,
• Level of required
modifications is low for new
vessels,
• It will stabilize the required
number of Greek Officers,
• It assures the continuation of
the Greek knowledge of
seamanship,
• It improves loyalty and
continuation of crews,
• A 1OO% Greek manning
compliment.
• It is a possible solution to the
loss of the competitiveness,
• Positive, at first glance,
investment appraisal,
however very sensitive to
changes,
• A Large number of Greek
officers is required in order
to be applied in a large fleet.
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• Additionally crew training is
required,
•  Necessitates a genuine
willingness of the pertinent
parties to participate in the
project,
• A matrix organisational
structure is required to
decrease the cost of the
project.
• Postulates and principles
regulate the project,
• Long effort before the
implementation of the project
(Appendix 3),
• It is less competitive than the
FOC vessels,
• The benefit generated is
probably lower than the
effort required,
• It is applicable only to
modern vessels,
• It is not applied to asset
players,
• It can be applied only to
companies with long
strategic planning and with
strong belief to the Greek
seafarers.
Table 31. SWOT analysis.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and recommendations
Based on the discussion in the previous chapters, the following conclusions have been
drawn:
• Potential savings in the daily operating cost can be realised either by reducing the
number of crew on board or by substituting the current crew with a cheaper
alternative.
• The latest amendments in Greek manning rules reduced the quota of Greek seafarers
to 60%. Higher reduction was expected by the shipowners.
• The increase of the Greek-controlled fleet is not in line with the increase of the
Greek-flagged fleet, because the former has exhibited an increase of 35% and the
latter has been decreased by 6,6%.
• The decline of the Greek-flagged fleet has been accelerated the last 5 years and
accounts for 13%.
• Athough the Greek-flagged fleet declines in terms of number of vessels, the gross
tonnage has increased because large vessels have been registered, particularly new-
buildings.
• The contribution of the Greek shipping industry to the endemic balance of trade
accounts for more than 2 billion $ per annum.
• In order that tourism, which is a very important sector of the national economy,
contributes with the same amount of foreign exchange, like shipping does, another 5
to 6 million tourists have to visit Greece each year.
• The more vessels are under the Greek flag, the more jobs are created ashore, since
Greek-flagged shipping creates a significant number of jobs ashore.
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• Each position on board creates four additional positions for the national economy,
and each dollar generated by shipping generates another one and a half dollar of
general income for the national economy.
• From the total amount of added value generated by shipping, 30% is generated by
the vessel, while the remaining 70%, is generated by activities in the offices
supporting the vessels.
• During the last decade the number of Greek seafarers has declined by 34%.
Concurrently, the level of unemployment has increased and during the period 1995-
1998 the increase accounts for 75%.
• The level of unemployment of Greek seafarers will be increased, since the latest
amendments reduced the quota of Greek seafarers to 60% of the full manning
compliment.
• A reduction of Greek seafarers is expected due to the re-flagging of Greek flagged
vessels as well as due the higher allowable quota of foreign crewmembers on board
Greek flagged vessels.
• The fact that the existing number of seafarers declines and that the shipping sector is
not attractive to new seafarers, causes a worry that the Greek shipping industry will
shortly face the problem of shortage of Greek seafarers.
•  In tankers and bulkers, the daily cost of H&M insurance has declined. In the 90s, the
decrease accounts for 17% and 35% respectively.
• For tankers, the P&I premium has increased by 89% since 1991. On the other hand,
for bulkers the increase accounts for 26%.
• The total cost increase in the R&M for bulk carriers, since 1991, accounts for 25%.
In tankers, the same cost is higher, because of the more stringent operating
environment. However, the cost of repairs and maintenance has decreased 7%.
• The cost of provision of supplies and lubricants, in the last 8 years, has declined by
6%, on average, for all sizes of vessels.
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• The nominal cost of newly built bulk carriers has declined by11% in the 90s. The
total reduction for the capital charges is higher than the reduction in the price of a
newly built bulk carrier and it was, on average, for the last 7 years, 15%.
• Mixed fortunes have been experienced in the second hand market for bulkers during
the  period 1991-1998. The capital charges for second hand acquisitions has been
risen, albeit not sharply.
• Newly built tankers were costing 15% lower, on average, at the end of 1996, in
comparison with those of 1991. The daily capital charge follows, in percentage, the
reduction of the prices.
• The second hand market prices of tankers has increased by 11% since 1991. The
percentage of increase in the price of second hand tankers coincides with the
percentage in the increase of the daily capital cost for these vessels.
• The price of fuel oil has increased since 1990 by 7%.
•  Port and canal dues have risen in the 90s. On the other hand, the major canals, Suez
and Panama, have experienced mixed fortunes in terms of traffic figures and as a
consequence tolls have been reduced or frozen.
• On one hand, the international cost associated with the operation of bulk carriers has
decreased by 12%. On the other hand, the international cost associated with the
operation of tankers has declined by 14%. Both conclusions refer to the period 1991-
1998.
• In the 90s, the manning cost on tankers has increased by 11%. The increase in the
bulkers accounts for 39% for the same period.
• In Greek drachma, the total increase of the Greek salaries accounts for 78% since
1991. However, expressing the salaries in US dollars the nominal increase is only
29%.
• The 29% increase in Greek salaries is higher, in comparison with the 19% increase
in the Total Crew Cost agreement given by ITF for the period 1991-1998.
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• Under the Greek flag, the annual tonnage taxes are 276% higher, compared to the
second most expensive flag.
• In the 90s, the total administration cost related to tankers has decreased by 6%, while
the similar cost related to bulkers has increased by 12%.
• Vessels manned with cheaper manning compliments than a Greek one, have a
competitive advantage over the Greek flagged vessels during the periods of recession
of the shipping market.
• Although manning reduction is not a new trend in shipping, no specific rules have
been established that shall be complied by shipowners/operators in order to attract
reduction in the manning levels.
• Reductions in manning level were the subsequent result of a considerable study,
review and experimentation by governments, operating companies and labour
organisations.
• The departmental distinction in the advanced vessels is highly skewed and the trend
is toward ship management officers rather than deck and engine officers.
• Shipowners/operators intending to undertake minimum manning level project shall
initially consider the general postulates of the flag-State related to the subject,
followed by a man-machinery trade off analysis. The allocation of ship management
shall accordingly be decided, before addressing the international principles where the
constraints of the model and the required modifications will be applied.
• The ISM Code is not related to minimal crewing, however the companies which
have implemented the Code, have a very important tool, if they intend to undertake
such project.
• By re-organising and re-assigning the workload structure and the duties, the
problems of fatigue and boredom in vessels with low manning level can be
overcome.
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• Enhanced living conditions through careful ergonomic attention to the design of
living areas and the fact that the smaller crew size by itself results in the breakdown
of the departmental distinctions, can overcome the problem of social interaction
among crew members in minimum manning level projects.
• The drug and alcohol abuse in minimum manning level projects requires careful
management of the alcohol availability and close monitoring of the physical and
emotional health of crew members.
• Since the level of automation in modern vessels is high, a company intending to
undertake minimal crewing projects shall focus its effort in the organisational
structure of the vessel and in re-organising the activities of the manning compliment.
•  Manning the vessel under a FOC is 46% less expensive than the manning under the
Greek flag, whereas the 10-man concept reduces this gap down to 27%. Hence, the
manning cost is reduced by 26%, resulting in the lower daily operating cost of the
vessel.
• The project of low manning level, as an investment, gives attractive figures; Payback
time 6 years, ROR 37%, ROI 18% and IRR 11%.
• The results of the investment appraisal are not the only criteria for a company to
undertake a project. It also considers factors such as effort required to achieve the
specific target and the profits generated in terms of volume of money.
• The sensitivity analysis of the IRR shows that the project as an investment can
generate unattractive figures in the cases when either savings from manning cost are
a  little lower or the cost of modification or the cost of capital is higher.
Additionally, the following is recommended to the Greek MARAD:
• The minimum manning level  project has two objectives; not only to reduce manning
cost but also to employ only national seafarers on board the vessel. Therefore, since
the high quota of national seafarers is of great importance for the MARAD and
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considering the fact that a FOC and the international registries result in the severe
reduction of the use of national seafarers, the MARAD should encourage innovation.
• The pre-study has revealed that a minimum manning project, as an investment, is
very sensitive. The cost required to build a vessel in order to be run with a minimum
manning level has not been discussed in this paper, since it was beyond the scope of
this research. However, the appropriate fittings of the vessel at the stage of a new-
building may be less costly than a modification of an existing vessel. Therefore, the
MARAD should encourage companies to consider such manning as an alternative at
the stage of ordering a vessel at a shipyard.
• As it was mentioned in the main body of this research, the full implementation of
modifying a vessel to be run with a minimum manning level requires time. It was
also explained that time is needed, because such projects are based on research from
shipping companies, governments and labor organisations. Therefore, the MARAD,
in order to make this idea attractive to shipping companies, should prepare a more
specified regulatory framework for such projects and educate, accordingly, the
national seafarers as well. These measures can result in considerable savings for
shipowners.
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Apppendix 1
TASKS TO BE EVALUATED
1.0 CARGO
1.1 On-load
1.2 Off-load
1.3 Maintenance of cargo,
equipment/deck stores/wares
and ballast tank cleaning and
repairs of cargo, desk
equipment, stores and wares.
1.4 Record keeping (port logs)
1.5 Repair
1.5.1 Reefer-
maintenance
1.5.2 Inspection
2.0 BALLAST
2.1 On-load
2.2 Off-load
3.0 NAVIGATION
3.1 Track keeping
3.1.1 Day-good visibility
3.1.2 Night-good
visibility
3.1.3 Restricted visibility
3.2 Manoeuvring
3.2.1 Chart Correction
3.3 Collision avoidance
3.4 Voyage/passage planning
3.5 Record/chart keeping and
update/bridge logs/charts and
navigation information
3.6 Maintenance
3.6.1 PMS
3.6.2 Unscheduled
3.7 Test vital systems
3.7.1 Prior to leaving
port
3.7.2 Prior to entering
port
3.8 Bridge housekeeping
3.9 Weather monitoring
3.9.1 Reporting
3.9.2 Planning
3.10 Hull performance
3.10.1 Monitoring
3.10.2 Manoeuvring
3.10.3 Planning
3.11 Training (equipment
operations, procedure review,
standard operations)
4.0 ENGINE OPERATIONS
4.1 Operations-routine and watch
standing
4.2 Maintenance
4.2.1 Unscheduled
4.2.2 PMS
4.3 Record keeping
4.3.1 Records and record
keeping
4.3.2 Soundings
5.0 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT (all non-
main engine propulsion equipment)
5.1 Generators
5.1.1 Operations
5.1.2 Unscheduled
maintenance
5.1.3 PMS
5.2 Fuel oil systems
5.2.1 Operations
5.2.2 Unscheduled
maintenance
5.2.3 PMS
5.3 Boilers
5.3.1 Operations
5.3.2 Unscheduled
maintenance
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5.3.3 PMS
5.4 Evaporators
5.4.1 Operations
5.4.2 Unscheduled
maintenance
5.4.3 PMS
5.5 Refrigerator/air conditioning
5.5.1 Operations
5.5.2 Unscheduled
maintenance
5.5.3 PMS
5.6 Sewage system
5.6.1 Operations
5.6.2 Unscheduled
maintenance
5.6.3 PMS
5.7 Inert gas system
5.7.1 Operations
5.7.2 Unscheduled
maintenance
5.7.3 PMS
5.8 Electrical/electrical control
systems
5.8.1 Operations
5.8.2 Unscheduled
maintenance
5.8.3 PMS
5.9 Tools and test equipment
5.9.1 Operations
5.9.2 Unscheduled
maintenance
5.9.3 PMS
5.10 Pumps
5.10.1 Operations
5.10.2 Unscheduled
maintenance
5.10.3 PMS
5.11 Fuel transfer
5.12 Record keeping
6.0 LONG RANGE RADIO
OPERATIONS
7.0 DECK OPERATIONS
7.1 Docking/undocking
7.2 Mooring/unmooring
(offshore)
7.3 Anchoring/heaving-in
7.4 Helicopter operations
7.5 Underwater lighting
7.6 Tugs/crane using
7.7 Preparation for going into
yard/dry dock
8.0 GENERAL OPERATIONS
8.1 Drills (lifeboat, fire fighting,
etc.)
8.2 Maintenance (lifeboats)
8.3 Safety tours
8.4 Vessel fabric maintenance
(paint, chip, grease, coat)
8.5  Deck equipment maintenance
(lights, structure, mooring
equipment, anchor, bow
transfer)
8.6 Line and wire maintenance
8.7 Stores and supplies
8.7.1 Handling
8.7.2 Storage
8.7.3 Ordering
8.8       Other training
8.9       Medical
8.10 Bunkering
8.11 Safety equipment
maintenance, gas test meters
and gauging equipment
8.12 Vessel structure
maintenance/repair
8.13 Steering gear maintenance
8.14 Cleaning/wash down
8.14.1 Deck
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8.14.2 Engine room
housekeeping
8.15 Supervise shore
personnel/gangs
8.16 Stability and cargo
planning
9.0 GENERAL ADMINISTRATION
9.1 Financial
9.2 Labour relations
9.3 Meetings
9.3.1 Shipboard
management
9.3.2 Safety
9.4 Payroll
9.5 Regulatory requirement,
monitoring/inspections/walk
arounds with inspection
regulatory authorities
9.6 Special projects
10.0 HOTEL FUNCTIONS
10.1 Catering
10.2 Accommodation and space
clearing
10.3 Management
10.4 Provisioning
10.5 Maintenance
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APPENDIX 3
Activities Table
Act Description
Successive
activity Craft1
Original
duration
1. Pre-study 2,3,4,5,6,8 T,C 2M
2. Define core tasks 7 T,C 1M
3. Define service tasks 7 T,C 1M
4. Analyse work methods 9 T,C 2M
5. Select equipment and suppliers 10,11,12 T 2
6. Communicate to MARAD/Unions/In-
house crews
9 GM 1M
7. Calculate workload 9 T,C 1M
8. Co-operate with class society 17 T 3
9. Establish new manning model 10,11,12 T,C 2M
10. Cost/benefit analysis 13,14,15,16 F 1W
11. Inspect the vessel 13,14,15,16 T 1W
12. Conceptual approval by MARAD 13,14,15,16 T 1M
13. Negotiate with MARAD 17 GM 1M
14. Negotiate with unions 17 GM 1M
15. Modify vessel 17 T,C 1½M
16. Educate and train the crew 18,19,20 C 1½M
17. Interim manning certificate 18,19,20 T 1W
18. Trial period 21 Ma 3M
19. Observation trip 21 Ma,T,C 2W
20. Evaluation and seminars to all parties
involved
21 C 1W
21. New manning certificate Completion 1W
Abbreviations:
GM: General manager,
C: Crew department,
T: Technical department,
F: Finance department,
Ma: Master,
M: month, W: week.
                                                          
1 Departments or individuals of the company that will undertake the described activities.
2 The activity will last until the establishment of new manning level.
3 The inter-change of information with the classification society will last until the interim manning certificate
will be issued.
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Arrow Diagram of the project
8
1
5
6
4
3 7
2
9
10
12
13
14
15
16
17 18
19
20
21
:indicates the critical path of the project.
11
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Project's Gantt
Chart
Month1 Month 2 Month 3 Month4 Month 5 Month 6 Month 7 Month 8 Month 9 Month 10 Month 11 Month 12
Activity Critical 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1
1 x
2
3
4 x
5
6
7
8
9 x
10
11
12 x
13
14
15
16 x
17
18 x
19
20
21 x
:indicates the slack time.
